

RECORDED - 5

100-93216-236
Date: November 4, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

To: [Redacted] b6
Director of Intelligence b7C
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to your letter dated September 27, 1949,
relating to the captioned matter.

Special Agent [Redacted] 800 Court Square Building,
Baltimore, Maryland, has been designated as the liaison representative
of this Bureau with your representatives at Camp Detrick, Maryland.

It is requested that you advise this Bureau of the identities
of the persons to be contacted by Special Agent [Redacted] at the Biological
Research Center, Camp Detrick, Maryland, when the necessary arrangements
have been completed by your Office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
11/7/49

11/7/49

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

RFM:jam

1 am

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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

NOV 16 1949

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 4 4 56 PM '49
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b7C

RECEIVED
NOV 4 1949
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
HARRIS
E.H.M.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *from letter*
 FROM : SAC, Baltimore *from 10-21-49*
 SUBJECT: *0* "BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE"

DATE: 10/20/49

ReBulet 10/14/49, captioned as above.

b6 SA is being designated the liaison agent to handle the required
 b7C contact with the representatives of the Army's Biological Research Center at
 Camp Detrick, Md.

In accordance with Bureau instructions, the liaison will not be initiated until
 after this office is subsequently advised by the Bureau that final arrangements
 have been made with the Intelligence Division of the Army.

RJL:arf
 66-891

~~RECORDED~~ RECORDING

*let Army
 11-4-49
 E.H.M. join*

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267UC/NLS/STH/RNP
 ON 9/2/04

RECORDED - 5

100-93216-236

37 APR 9 1949

5-5 Hm

SAC, San Francisco

PERSONAL ATTENTION

November 9, 1949

Director, FBI

DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

100-3216-238
Reurlet November 4, 1949, and Bulet September 14, 1949.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/3/04 BY 60322/UC/STP/ANP

EX-34
RECORDED - 76

b2 Pursuant to your request, the Bureau will inform the Director of
b7D the Office of Naval Intelligence that [redacted] is cooperating with the Bureau
at the Bureau's request in connection with the captioned matter.

Authority is granted for you to have [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] The identity of your informant may be made known to [redacted]
[redacted] should not be made known.

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Authority is also granted to your Office to not disclose information
concerning [redacted] to the Office of Naval
Intelligence or to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army
in the event that either of these agencies conduct a security clearance inves-
tigation of the informant. The fact that this informant is assisting the Bureau
will be made known to the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence by the
Bureau if and when [redacted] In this con-
b2 nection, you should make certain that if information concerning [redacted] is in
b7D the possession of any other field office who might logically be contacted
b7E during a security clearance investigation, a communication is directed to such
offices advising them of the Bureau's instructions.

Authority is granted for you to [redacted]

Pursuant to your previous request, authority is granted for your
Office to contact [redacted] will consent to engage
in the captioned program. The informant should be generally advised of the
nature and purpose of this assignment. It is not desired that the identity of
[redacted] be revealed to the informant and there would appear to be no reason to
advise [redacted] of the nature of the research being conducted under [redacted] The
informant should be advised of [redacted]

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b7E

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

EHM:omr

NOV 10 1949 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REGISTERED

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Upon securing the consent of [redacted] to participate in this program,
you should [redacted]

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As indicated in the referenced Bulet, this entire matter must be handled thoroughly, tactfully, and every effort made by you to properly develop this case.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 4, 1949

FROM : SAC, San Francisco

SUBJECT: DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
① BIOLOGICAL WARFAREAIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
REGISTERED, RRRINDEXED *76*

Rebulet October 25, 1949, September 14, 1949, and July 20, 1949.


Conf 2/15
[redacted] is interested in cooperating in instant program. [redacted][redacted][redacted] was contacted in accordance with Bulet of July 20 and con-
siders program excellent idea with good prospects for success. [redacted][redacted]

[redacted] willing to cooperate in program [redacted]

[redacted]CFB:VL
100-30190
cc: 100-29874EX-34
RECEIVED
ACK 11-9-49
FBI
INDEXED
RECORDED - 76100-93216-7
NOV 10 1949b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-5-5798-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/2/01 BY 60322/UC/MS/STP/LOUPb2
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b7D
b7E



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Based upon the value of information presently being received from [redacted] and the increased value of [redacted] on instant program, it is believed that [redacted] would warrant [redacted] from this office. It is, therefore, my personal recommendation that [redacted] be authorized at this time to be effective upon the date of [redacted] on this program. Inasmuch as no further action can be taken by this office in connection with the captioned matter until Bureau advice is received with regard to the matters mentioned hereinbefore, the Bureau is urged to afford this matter its earliest possible consideration.

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November 4, 1949

RECORDED - 105

100 93216-239

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[redacted]
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

b7D

Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum dated October 31, 1949, captioned "BW Intelligence in [redacted] and enclosure dated October 7, 1949.

It is requested that this Bureau be furnished with any similar type reports or information relating to Biological Warfare which may come to your attention in the future.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

EHM:cal

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/3/04 BY 60262UC/KS/SP/RNP

NOV 7 10 39 AM '49

RECEIVED DIRECT
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 3
★ NOV 7 - 1949 PM.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

36 NOV 23 1949

RECEIVED NOV 10 1949
RECEIVED NOV 10 1949
RECEIVED NOV 10 1949

Handwritten signatures and initials: "H6", "H37", "E.H.", "J.E.", "J.C.", "J.D.", "J.F.", "J.G.", "J.H.", "J.I.", "J.J.", "J.K.", "J.L.", "J.M.", "J.N.", "J.O.", "J.P.", "J.Q.", "J.R.", "J.S.", "J.T.", "J.U.", "J.V.", "J.W.", "J.X.", "J.Y.", "J.Z."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : H. B. Fletcher *HB7C*

FROM :

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

DATE: November 3, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/3/04 BY 60267 UC/NIS/EXT/ANP

Pg1, OGA 10/18/04 60267 UC/NIS/6;A)RNP

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Carson	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the contents of a report on the estimate of the situation in Biological Warfare (BW) intelligence in dated 10-7-49 made by the Joint Biological Warfare Intelligence Committee and furnished to the Bureau by National Security Council Representative on Internal Security.

b6

BACKGROUND:

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The report furnished to the Bureau by indicates that since

b7D

CONTENTS OF REPORT:

The report reflects that information received by the above-referred to committee confirms the previous supposition that

ACTION:

None. The above is for your information.

EHM:eal

52 NOV 28 1949

RECORDED
INDEXED 29

100-73216-240
3 NOV 1949

EX-116
FIVE
WAG

100-93216-241
CHANGED TO (Carried as
unlocked
enclosure)
66-03-1019

DEC 22 1949

858

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/2/04 BY 60267UC/NLS/ADN/RNP

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

FROM : H. B. Fletcher *HBF*

SUBJECT: ① "BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE"

DATE: October 14, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/3/64 BY 60367UC/NK/STP/NP

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To secure your approval in order that the Bureau's Liaison representative with the Department of the Army can be briefed on matters of interest to the Bureau in the captioned case. To secure your approval for an Agent of the Baltimore Office to maintain liaison in the captioned case for the Bureau with the Army's Biological Research Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland.

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BACKGROUND:

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You will recall that by memorandum dated August 4, 1949, I furnished to you background information in the captioned case which suggested additional steps that the Bureau could take to increase our knowledge in relation to the captioned matter.

Among these suggestions was the recommendation that a communication be directed to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army requesting that agency to keep us currently advised of all information relating to Biological Warfare which would assist and enable us in recognizing potential techniques and in locating any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage agents. In addition, it was suggested that a liaison arrangement be instituted between the Bureau and representatives of the Army's Biological Warfare Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland, in order that we might be furnished with the latest developments and discoveries in the Biological Warfare field which relate to our responsibilities. By letter dated September 16, 1949, the above two suggestions in the form of requests were forwarded to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army.

IDA has now advised that [redacted] Intelligence Division, Specialist in Biological Warfare, is available to brief Bureau representatives on BW at the Bureau's convenience. According to IDA, [redacted] will also be in a position to furnish advice as to the scope, type and sources of information relative to BW in which the Bureau might be interested. IDA further informed that their personnel had been advised of the Bureau's requirements for information concerning BW and that in the future all such information received by them would be made available to the Bureau. IDA further advised that in order that the desired liaison with the Biological Warfare Center

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Attachment

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RECORDED - 84

34 NOV 29 1949

62 NOV 30 1949

at Camp Detrick, Maryland, could be established, they suggested that the Bureau submit the names of its Liaison representatives to them in order that they might make arrangements through the Chemical Corps for representatives to deal directly with the BW Center, Camp Detrick, Maryland.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

b6 It is recommended that the Bureau's Liaison representative with IDA
b7C contact [] for the purpose of securing as much information
available concerning BW which will assist and enable us to recognize potential
techniques and to locate in the United States and in the territories under our
jurisdiction any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW
sabotage agents.

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Baltimore
Office requesting them to advise the Bureau of the identity of the Agent in their
Office to be used as a Liaison Agent by that Office at Camp Detrick, Maryland.

It is recommended that upon receipt by the Bureau of the identity of
the Baltimore Field Office Agent selected to handle this matter, that Liaison
furnish his identity to IDA in order that appropriate liaison arrangements can
be made by the Bureau with Army representatives at Camp Detrick, Maryland.

I agree. J. H. [Signature]

OPY 11-10-49 bk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA AIRMAIL

Date: October 31, 1949

To: Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: VITAL FACILITIES
THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

① BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

In reference to the lists of various facilities considered by the Defense Establishment to be of major importance to a war effort, it is desired to bring to your attention the following pertinent information.

You are aware that included in the above-referred to lists are the water supply systems of many of the major cities in the United States, including the City of New York. [redacted] Commissioner of the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity, New York [redacted] recently advised this Bureau that his Department is frequently requested to admit representatives of foreign governments to inspect the New York water system and that such inspections are allowed.

There are transmitted herewith photostatic copies of eighteen self-explanatory letters and memoranda which were made available to this Bureau by Commissioner Paduano relating to this matter and which indicate that representatives of foreign governments are also being allowed to visit water facilities in other cities of the United States which are named as vital facilities in the above-referred to lists.

EHM/de

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81 NOV 18 1949

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It is not known by this Bureau whether foreign representatives are being furnished with blue prints and/or detailed information concerning these water supply systems at the time they are conducted on these tours of inspection. It is believed, however, that in view of the apparent danger to the internal security of this country from the standpoint of biological warfare sabotage, the personnel in charge of these facilities should use considerable caution in furnishing information to representatives of foreign governments.

The above information and the information contained in the attached documents are being furnished to you in confidence for whatever action you deem desirable, ~~in accordance with the Bureau's policy of jurisdiction over the protection of these vital facilities~~ but the details thereof should not be distributed outside your agency.

Enclosure

cc: Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

CC: Director of Special Investigations (I.G.)
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

Enclosure

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER *HBF*
 FROM : *PK*
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

DATE: November 16, 1949

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Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Ladd in the above-captioned matter dated October 14, 1949 which indicated you believed efforts should be made to have the IDA keep the Bureau currently advised of all information relating to biological warfare which would assist and enable the Bureau in recognizing potential techniques and in locating any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage agents. You recommended that the Bureau's Liaison representative with IDA contact [redacted] for the purpose of securing as much information available concerning BW which will assist and enable the Bureau to recognize potential techniques and to locate in the United States and in the territories under our jurisdiction any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage agents.

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This matter has been discussed at some length with [redacted] by [redacted] stated that as background reading, a book recently published by Dr. Rosebury entitled, "Peace or Pestilence" would be excellent background reading. [redacted] also advised [redacted]

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In addition,

[redacted] could bring it to the Bureau's attention. This material will be procured from [redacted] and will be routed directly to [redacted] in the Espionage Section.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section for their information.

RECORDED - 59

EX-87

100-93016-5
34 NOV 29 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 9/3/04 BY 60267UC/HUS/AM/KWP

EX-101

52 DEC 1 1949

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SAC Letter #104
Series 1949
11-16-49

(A) BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE -- Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 81, dated May 25, 1948, series 1948, captioned, "Bacteriological Warfare - Sabotage."

It is the Bureau's desire that the referenced SAC Letter be thoroughly reviewed by those Agents in your Office assigned to the investigation of espionage, internal security, security matter and/or nationalistic tendency cases in conjunction with the information contained herein. As you are aware, the responsibility of the Bureau in the captioned matter is to determine the existence and whereabouts of any sabotage and espionage agents in the United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Hawaii, and to prevent, if possible, the carrying out of any acts of sabotage and/or espionage in this field. This does not imply, however, that this Bureau is responsible for the physical protection of any installation or facility. The information contained herein and the subject matter involved is strictly confidential. It is not to be discussed or disseminated outside of the personnel of your Office who would logically have an interest therein.

For your information, there is attached hereto a summary memorandum, the contents of which were ~~classified top secret~~ by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reflecting the purpose, the matters considered and the recommendations of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on Biological Warfare.

In order to insure that your Field Office will be kept currently advised of the latest information concerning Biological Warfare developments abroad and in the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been requested to keep the Bureau advised of all such developments in this field. Pertinent information

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100-73216-
NOT RECORDED
59 NOV 18 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-27-80 BY SP-16SK/DB/CNB

SAC Letter No. 104
Series 1949
11-16-49

will be brought promptly to your attention upon its receipt by the Bureau. Liaison is also being established with the Army's Biological Warfare Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland, by the Bureau in order that you can be kept currently informed of developments at that installation which may be of aid to your Office in this matter.

The Bureau is responsible for keeping the other signers of the Delimitation Agreement advised of matters of mutual interest in the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage in the continental United States, the territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Alaska. In line with the Bureau's responsibility as stated in the Delimitation Agreement it is absolutely necessary, therefore, for the Bureau to furnish to the signers of the Delimitation Agreement all pertinent information secured by the Bureau from its sources in the United States or abroad relating to Biological Warfare in order that these agencies can afford protection to any installation or facility which is indicated to be an enemy Biological Warfare target and/or in order that these agencies can develop in their laboratories an aggressive agent to counteract the Biological Warfare sabotage agents which may be employed by the enemy.

Any information received by your Office from a reliable source relating to Biological Warfare - Sabotage - Espionage should be forwarded promptly to the Bureau in order that it can be appropriately disseminated to interested government agencies or to other Bureau Field Offices.

During the investigation of any internal security, nationalistic tendency, security matter, or espionage case in your Field Office where information is developed indicating that an individual, group of individuals or an organization is engaged in any questionable activity relating to the field of Biological Warfare Research, such information should be promptly furnished to the Bureau under the caption of this letter.

The importance of the captioned matter in its relation to the internal security of the United States and in its relation to the responsibility of this Bureau is self-evident. You are instructed to personally bring the contents of this letter to the attention of those agents in your Office who are assigned to the type of investigation previously referred to herein.

Date: December 7, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY REGISTERED MAIL

To: Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Chief,
Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
ESPIONAGE

Reference is made to your letter dated September 27, 1949, and to my memorandum dated November 4, 1949, relating to the captioned matter.

It is requested that you advise this Bureau whether you have been able to make the necessary arrangements in order that Special Agent [redacted] of the Baltimore Office of this Bureau can initiate liaison with the representatives at the Biological Research Center, Camp Dietrich, Maryland.

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60327UC/NLS/eta/emp
ON 9/3/04

RECORDED - 111

100-95216-242

FBI
64 DEC 9 1949

EHM:jpa

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

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DEC 8 - 1949
COMM - FBI

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RECEIVED - 101

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [REDACTED] b6
 FROM : [REDACTED] b7C
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

DATE: November 16, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 9/3/04 BY 60324 [REDACTED]

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum to Mr. Fletcher from [REDACTED] in the above-captioned matter dated October 25, 1949. The referenced memorandum indicated that a report had been received from IDA containing information relating to reported [REDACTED] obtained by [REDACTED] in 1946 from an unidentified [REDACTED]. The referenced memorandum desired that the Liaison Section ascertain from IDA their evaluation of the memorandum from the standpoint of their research with BW agents and particularly from the standpoint of the practicality and effectiveness of the methods of distribution of the diseases mentioned. It was requested that the Liaison Section ascertain whether or not IDA has received any later information along these lines.

This matter has been discussed by [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] who has indicated that no additional reports have been received. [REDACTED] indicated that the methods of distribution as discussed in the memorandum are entirely plausible.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section for their information.

SWR:mk

60 JAN 6-1950

INDEXED - 126
 RECORDED - 126

34 DEC 18 1949

100-93216-245

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : H. B. Fletcher *WFK*

b6

DATE: October 25, 1949

FROM : *WFK*

b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Holmes _____
 Miss Gandy _____

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S) b1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S) b1

Action

It is recommended that the Liaison Section determine from IDA the information desired above.

EHM:ofm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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34 DEC 13 1949

9/9/04

CLASSIFIED BY *uchks/bia/RUP* *Derivative*
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 9/9/2029

Director, FBI

November 2, 1949

SAC, New York

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[redacted] was.
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/9/01 BY 60267UC/N4/ETA/RMP

RA 3-1

You are advised that the captioned individual again visited the New York Office, at which time, he was interviewed through an interpreter. Heretofore, [redacted] as no translator of that language was available at the time of his visit, [redacted] and his remarks were translated by SA [redacted] of this office.

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[redacted] unable to speak English with any degree of fluency. [redacted] able to convey in English that he still maintains the same places of employment and residences.

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] contributed articles on occasions to a Ukrainian newspaper, "Svoboda" located in Jersey City, New Jersey. [redacted]

[redacted] drew attention to an article which appeared in the Russian language paper "Novoye Russkoe Slovo" on September 27, 1949, and entitled, "Bombs 'VIR'". As this was in Russian, [redacted] volunteered to write the New York Office and furnish the article [redacted]

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[redacted] Translator of the New York Office. The pertinent parts of this letter read as follows:

"On September 26th the Parisian newspaper 'Figaro' carried an article about the Soviet 'Atomgrad' - (Atomcity) at the Caucasus. This article confirms the material on this question in my possession. I had received the material in January, 1949 from an acquaintance of mine, Konstantine Kasperuk, previously a Soviet journalist, who resides now in Germany. K. Kasperuk, Munich 27, Box 67 U. S. Zone. The material, sent by Kasperuk, says:

"The poorly populated valley of the Zang river lies between the Eastern foot-hill of the Alagez Mountain, the Lake Sevan and the Kanakirsky Plateau. It is a forbidden zone.

CC: NY 100-80472
NY 100-91131

100-93216-
NOT RECORDED
132 DEC 30 1949

FXP:JCH
100-39553

58 JAN 6 1950

Biological Warfare - Sabotage, Espionage

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-354239-

Letter to Director
NY 100-89553

"In 1945 there were brought in several thousands of German prisoners of war. Up to the Fall of 1947 there was excavated more than half a million cubic meters of basalt. There were built six (6) colossal underground structures invulnerable from the air. All high voltage mountings were brought from Germany. Uranium came from Czecho-Slovakia. The work of making the atom bomb had an experimental character. All this information Kasperuk received from a run-away technician who belonged to a scientific mission in Berlin and was working himself in this 'Atomgrad'".

"Enclosed you will find a newspaper clipping 'Bombs VIR'.

"This material I also received from Kasperuk and published it in the newspaper. I do not doubt its authenticity."

The article referred to, also likewise translated by
read as follows:

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"Bombs 'VIR'"

"Every year in the fields of the Kuban*) experimental station of the All-Union Institute of Plant-Nursery - 'VIR', a very rich collection of various agricultural microorganisms is planted. Tens of thousands of different plants brought here from the world over are collected there for experimentation in interbreeding and cultivation of new kinds of crops. At the same time there is studied the degree of which a plant can be subjected to various sicknesses, to all kinds of plant pests, numerous varieties of mould (rust), phylloxera, pink worm, tick, weevil etc.

"Special attention is paid to pests which destroy 'en masse' the crops of wheat, cotton, maize, beans, potatoes, grapes and technical crops.

"All these scientific experiments have great importance not only from the point of view of peace matters: Many scientists, as the scientific worker of 'VIR' - V. S. Zelenetsky and senior laboratorian, A.D. Trubchaninov, have been experimenting intensively for several years with the idea of the military use of pests from agricultural farms.

"There are two types of 'VIR' bombs. From the first one is expected a prolonged period of action, when they count on the prolonged exhaustion of vegetative and therefore vital resources of the adversary (for several

Letter to Director
NY 100-89553

"years). The second type of bomb is the offensive one when a faster victory is expected. In this 'bomb' are used the rapidly developing pests, the functions of which demand less time, for example one season or one year.

"The beneficial climate of the North Caucasus is identical with the climate of the Central and Southern parts of the U.S.A. in temperature, in soil and in atmospheric precipitations. For this reason, particular attention is paid to plants grown in the U.S.A.

"Verbatim

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"Translator: [redacted]

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(Translator's notes - *) Kuban is a river at the North Caucasus, also a territory. 'VIR' - All-Union Institute of Plant-Nursery.)".

During his personal visit, [redacted] asked if it was possible for him to see, and show some unidentified friends, a photograph of a recently arrived Displaced Person, [redacted] by name. [redacted] had read in the "Novoye Russkoe Slovo", of the arrival of the SS General Hershey in Boston on August 27, 1949. Included in the Displaced Persons aboard this vessel was [redacted]

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[redacted] is possibly identical with a person of the same name, who until August, 1947 was in a Displaced Person's Camp in Frankfurt, Germany, [redacted]

[redacted] According to what [redacted] had been told, [redacted] in Germany had disappeared from the Displaced Person's Camp and was last seen in a truck traveling from the American Zone into the Soviet Zone.

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The only other additional information [redacted] had with respect to [redacted]

The information concerning the employment and training of [redacted]

Letter to Director
NY 100-89553

[redacted] as mentioned in the preceding paragraph was obtained from [redacted]

[redacted] are now in the United States.

The New York indices were reviewed on [redacted] The only reference located was to [redacted]

The New Haven Office, in the case entitled, "London, ESPIONAGE - R", reported the above data concerning [redacted]

No further identifying information concerning this [redacted] could be located in the New York files.

* * * * *

[redacted]
[redacted] saw [redacted] several pieces of letter size paper bearing the printed heading, "Communist Party". [redacted] unable to read the contents, [redacted] the paper bore the aforementioned heading. [redacted] these papers were half in and out of a brown envelope. [redacted] discarded the envelope in the wastebasket. [redacted] letter retrieved the envelope and cut therefrom the return address.

This read as follows:

"Monthly Bulletin
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York
65 Liberty Street
New York 5, New York "

The New York files are negative of any pertinent information concerning [redacted]

Due to the fact that the information presented by [redacted] concerning

Letter to Director
NY 100-89553

[redacted] no further
investigation in this matter is contemplated.

With reference to [redacted] the New York Office plans to take appropriate steps to obtain a photograph of the individual of this name, who arrived at Boston on August 27, 1949. When and if such photograph is obtained, the Bureau will be so advised and permission requested to allow the photograph to be displayed to [redacted]

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Two extra copies of instant letter are being provided the Bureau. This has been done because copies of instant letter have been placed in the New York files entitled, "Soviet War Plans - Internal Security - R", and "Bacteriological Warfare, Internal Security - R; Sabotage" and it is thought possible that the Bureau might desire to do likewise.

copy:ahs

OFFICE-MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOV

December 21, 1949

TO

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FROM

b7C

SUBJECT: DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
O BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Biological Warfare Summary

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Fletcher dated November 17, 1949, in the captioned matter wherein Special Agent [redacted] was requested to secure more detailed information relating to the list of BW research projects in the United States.

There are set forth below the results of a review of the Bureau files on the names of persons connected with BW research in the United States, which names were obtained by Bureau Liaison from the Department of the Army.

[redacted] A letter from the New York Office dated February 13, 1940, captioned [redacted] was... et al, Espionage" contains information that [redacted] was the subject of an Espionage investigation in 1940. The letter further stated that [redacted] was visited several times by [redacted]

Alexander Goetz, aka, Karl Withem Alexander Gustav Goetz, Associate Professor of Physics, California Institute of Technology: A review of the Bureau files concerning captioned individual reveals that he was originally the subject of a Bureau espionage investigation on the basis of information received by [redacted]

[redacted] Goetz was pro-German and anti-British and "up to no good in the United States." Investigation revealed Goetz was born on November 17, 1897, at Wiedbaden, Germany, and entered the United States at New York City October 12, 1930. He filed declaration of intention at Los Angeles August 11, 1933, and filed petition for naturalization in 1940 which was granted at Los Angeles May 25, 1940, certificate No. 4797552. Goetz has been a professor of physics under [redacted] at the California Institute of Technology since 1930 and was recognized internationally as tops in the field of physical chemistry. He has done considerable work on the reactions of micro organisms to sub-zero temperature by studying the survival of animals after freezing. Working with the Navy he helped perfect the process for conversating sea water into fresh water by the use of silverized carbon pellets.

During the later Bureau investigation of Goetz as the subject of possible denaturalization proceedings, allegations were received that he had

EHM:ow

104 INDEXED

100-93211-247
NOT RECORDED
48 DEC 30 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/9/04 BY 60272uc/rs/aw/ewp

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Original copy filed in 161

copy:ahs

made statements to the effect that he was a Nazi and in favor of Hitler policies; was a close friend of [redacted]; an active member of the German Bund; and connected with the German Club of Los Angeles. Investigation failed to prove any of these allegations and Goetz on interview emphatically denied all allegations with the exception of his connection with the German Club of Los Angeles, whose meetings he admitted attending since 1930 and joining this club in 1938. Investigation of the German Club of Los Angeles failed to reveal that this organization was engaged in any un-American activities. Copies of Bureau reports covering the investigation of Goetz have previously been furnished to ONI, G2 and the State Department.

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[redacted] The report of Special Agent Robert G. Gibbs dated August 14, 1947, at Washington, D. C., captioned "American Soviet Science Society, Inc." contained the following information: Temporary confidential informant [redacted] furnished to the WFO in July, 1947, [redacted]

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(100-344903-25)

[redacted] A highly delicate and reliable source advised on June 24, 1944, that [redacted] was listed as a member of the general committee of the Science Committee of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship. (100-344903-13 p. 16)

The report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 4, 1947, at Washington, D. C., captioned American Soviet Science Society, Inc., contained the following information: Temporary confidential informant [redacted] furnished to the WFO in July, 1947, [redacted]

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(100-344903-75)

[redacted] The report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 4, 1947, at Washington, D. C., captioned American Soviet Science Society, Inc., contained the following information: Temporary confidential informant [redacted] furnished to the WFO in July, 1947, [redacted]

copy:ans

[redacted] (100-344903-25 and 121-2673-4 encl. p. 187)

[redacted] According to a highly confidential and reliable source of the Chicago Office, [redacted]

[redacted] (116-77092-4)

Investigation of [redacted] in 1945, a contact of [redacted] determined that [redacted]

[redacted] (65-11750-55 p. 3)

A personal information form executed by [redacted] referred to above, [redacted]

[redacted] (100-344367-25)

The above information should be verified with the Chicago Office.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be filed pending receipt of additional information being obtained by Special Agent [redacted] from G-2 in the captioned case.

100-3216-248

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENCL.

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/14/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/Kja/CB

#977600

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-160

URGENT

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. SEPTEMBER 18, 1950

Transmit the following message to: SAC, SPRINGFIELD

X HOG CHOLERA, INFORMATION CONCERNING. REURTEL SEPTEMBER FIFTEEN LAST.

INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY OMAHA OFFICE SEPTEMBER FOURTEEN LAST BASED ON ALLEGATIONS BY CONGRESSMAN KARL STEFAN, NEBRASKA, THAT THERE HAS BEEN THIRTY TO FIFTY PER CENT LOSS IN HOGS AFTER INOCULATION FOR CHOLERA IN NEBRASKA.

STEFAN ADVISED PRESS AND BUREAU POSSIBLE QUOTE COMMUNIST PLOT UNQUOTE. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO INTERVIEW [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR COMPLETE DETAILS RE THIS MATTER AND THEREAFTER CONDUCT ANY OTHER LOGICAL INVESTIGATION DEEMED NECESSARY. SUBMIT PROMPTLY RESULTS TO BUREAU AND OMAHA O OF O IN REPORT FORM UNDER CHARACTER SABOTAGE.

HOOVER

EPL:JAG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/9/04 BY SP4TMC/MLB/STP/ENP

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1950

TELETYPE

SENT VIA

58 OCT 13 1950

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECORDED
INDEXED

SEP 18 7 14 PM '50
INDEXED

100-93216-349

Per

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 17 1950

TELETYPE

FBI WASHINGTON D C

9-18-50

7-52 PM NRJ

SAC, SPRINGFIELD

U R G E N T

HOG CHOLERA, INFORMATION CONCERNING. REURTEL SEPTEMBER FIFTEEN LAST. INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY OMAHA OFFICE SEPTEMBER FOURTEEN LAST BASED ON ALLEGATIONS BY CONGRESSMAN KARL STEFAN, NEBRASKA, THAT THERE HAS BEEN THIRTY TO FIFTY PER CENT LOSS IN HOGS AFTER INOCULATION FOR CHOLERA IN NEBRASKA. STEFAN ADVISED PRESS AND BUREAU POSSIBLE QUOTE COMMUNIST PLOT UNQUOTE. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO INTERVIEW [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR COMPLETE DETAILS RE TIXXX THIS MATTER AND THEREAFTER CONDUCT ANY OTHER LOGICAL INVESTIGATION DEEMED NECESSARY. SUBMIT PROMPTLY RESULTS TO BUREAU AND OMAHA O OF O IN REPORT FORM UNDER CHARACTER SABOTAGE.

HOOVER

ACK AND HOLD PLS.....

OK FBI SI RLH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/9/04 BY 60321UC/JS/STP/JP

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Baltimore
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

DATE: 1/5/50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Reurlet 10/14/49, and my reply of 10/20/49, concerning the designation of an Agent of this Office to maintain liaison with representatives of the Army's Biological Warfare Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland, the liaison relationship to be initiated upon receipt of advice from the Bureau concerning the final arrangements being made by the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army with the U. S. Army Chemical Corps.

On 12/27/49, information was received from the [redacted] at Camp Detrick that [redacted] had a matter of importance he desired to discuss with Special Agent [redacted] of this Office. On the following day, [redacted] as well as [redacted] Special Operations Division, was interviewed by [redacted] advised that several weeks previously, he had been advised by letter from Washington that Agent [redacted] had been designated to act in the capacity of liaison agent in connection with the Biological Warfare Program at Camp Detrick; that [redacted] is the representative with whom contact should be maintained and that [redacted] is the alternate.

During the interview with [redacted] it was ascertained that the Special Operations Division operates directly under [redacted] Director of the Biological Department of the Army Chemical Corps, who has his Headquarters at Camp Detrick. At the present time, there are twelve persons employed in the Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick, although plans are being made to increase the personnel and expand the operations of this Division. A new building, which is to house the offices and laboratory of the Special Operations Division, is under construction and should be completed by August, 1950.

[redacted] relates to experiments concerning the potency of BW agents and their capacity to cause danger or death in man, animals or plants, and he added that his work is performed with both Offensive and Defensive BW in mind, particularly Defensive BW. From the Offensive BW standpoint, he pointed out, definite plans have already been made by the Army as to what BW agents could best be utilized against an enemy as a retaliatory measure. Thus, his primary function at this time concerns itself with BW and specifically, with pointing out vulnerabilities to BW sabotage.

RECORDED - 124

INDEXED - 124

100-93216-250

101

RCV:AC
66-891

52 JAN 17 1950

Put in
SAC's file
but not read
your HOF
2/1/50

5-EM

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Letter to Baltimore

We will just advise them

DECLASSIFIED BY 2000 JFC/STW/KUP ON 9/9/04

L/Director, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
1/5/50

Relative to vulnerability to BW sabotage, it was ascertained that the Special Operations Division plans to conduct various tests to demonstrate what could be accomplished by BW saboteurs. The Pentagon Building, where approximately 30,000 persons are employed, including ranking military personnel, was selected as the target for one experiment. [redacted] stated that the results of this test have been printed in booklet form marked ~~Top Secret~~, and distributed to interested agencies including the FBI.

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The booklet consists principally of a series of charts demonstrating the effectiveness of an experimental "BW attack" on the Pentagon Building. This particular test was conducted by the Special Operations Division with knowledge of the Secretary of War and one other person connected with the Pentagon Building who assisted [redacted]

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
At this point [redacted] pointed out certain advantages of BW over Chemical Warfare, one being that various types of BW agents could be used, designed either to cause death or to incapacitate temporarily and to take effect immediately or after a period of minutes, hours or days. The test in question proved, according to [redacted] that within a relatively short period of time, all persons in the Pentagon Building would be exposed without knowing of the presence of a BW agent, which is odorless and gives no warning.

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
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b7D


L/Director, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
1/5/50



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b7D



[redacted] displayed a fountain pen obtained from Poland and a
cigarette lighter from Czechoslovakia, which are in common use in those
countries. [redacted]



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L/Director, CONFIDENTIAL
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
1/5/50

The Bureau is requested to advise concerning the final arrangements made by the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army with the U. S. Army Chemical Corps in order that appropriate liaison may be maintained with representatives at Camp Detrick.

SAC, Baltimore

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

January 9, 1950

Director, FBI

REGISTERED MAIL

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 100-93216-251
ON 9/16/00

RECORDED - 72

Re Bureau letter October 14, 1949, and your letter October 20, 1949.

The Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army (IDA) has now advised the Bureau that appropriate liaison arrangements have been made in order that Special Agent [] of your office can make the desired contact at the Army's Biological Warfare Research Center, Camp Detrick, Maryland.

[] has been designated as the person for Special Agent [] to contact. [] has been designated as an alternate for [] IDA has requested that Special Agent [] notify either [] directly by telephone or letter prior to each visit.

As indicated in the referenced Bureau letter, it is the Bureau's desire that liaison at Camp Detrick should be maintained on a monthly basis unless developments indicate that a shorter period of time between contacts is desirable.

The purpose of instituting this liaison is to enable the Bureau to have in its possession the necessary information relating to the captioned matter which will enable us to more efficiently carry out our investigative responsibilities. It is desired that the Bureau be kept currently advised of all pertinent information relating to biological warfare which will enable us to recognize potential biological warfare (BW) sabotage and/or espionage techniques, and which will assist us to locate in the United States and in the territories under the Bureau's jurisdiction any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage-espionage agents.

Through liaison at Camp Detrick, it is believed that we can secure appropriate background data concerning BW and information concerning the latest developments and discoveries in this field which will assist the Bureau in carrying out its responsibilities. Information obtained by Special Agent [] during his contacts at Camp Detrick should be furnished to the Bureau in a clear, concise, and intelligent manner on a thirty-day basis.

It is believed that Special Agent [] should be thoroughly familiar with SAC Letter #81 dated May 25, 1948, captioned "Biological Warfare - Sabotage," and SAC Letter #104, Section A, dated November 16, 1949, captioned "Biological Warfare - Sabotage - Espionage," prior to making his first contact at Camp Detrick.

Special Agent [] is instructed to personally see that this matter is given thorough attention and that the results of Special Agent Vogel's first contact at Camp Detrick be furnished to the Bureau by January 25, 1950.

EHM:jog

JAN 10 1950
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 1, 1949

FROM : MR. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/20/04 BY 60267UC/NLS/RTA/RNP

Pg. 2 FP3, DCA7/26/04 60267UC/NLS/BJ/RAO

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

PURPOSE

To inform you of the results of the 7th Conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country.

This conference was held on June 11, 1949 at Two Park Avenue, New York City and was attended by members of the regular committee and by [redacted] Office of Civil Defense Planning, and [redacted] Committee on BW, Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment.

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BACKGROUND

You will recall that this is the committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of former Secretary James Forrestal, of the National Military Establishment, to study various methods of unconventional warfare. You will also recall that I have furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of this committee are questionable from a security standpoint.

RESULTS OF 7th CONFERENCE (6/11/49)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau's liaison representative on June 17, 1949 the minutes of the seventh meeting of this committee, which are attached for your information. From a review of these minutes, the following activity was noted.

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The Committee considered the minutes of the previous meeting and questioned a statement attributed to [redacted] which indicated that it would be extremely difficult for an enemy to make any serious impact on our normal economy through BW attacks on our food sources. The minutes were corrected to indicate that if this country were pressed; it could probably increase its agricultural output from 30% to 50% but that during an all-out atomic war, attacks on our food supply might have serious repercussions.

EHM/de

RECORDED

INDEXED

100-93216-203

37 JUL 20 1949

32 AUG 12 1949

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[redacted] a member of the Secretariat of the Committee on BW, Research and Development Board, presented a summary of intelligence reports dealing with biological warfare sabotage. The BW sabotage instances cited by [redacted] reportedly occurred during the war between China and Japan, in the 1930's during the Spanish Civil War and during World War II, and as recent as 1948 by the Jews in Palestine against the British and Arabs. The means reportedly used or recommended consisted of poisoning food, cattle, toothpaste, wells, confined areas, pastures, railroad beds, reservoirs, et cetera.

The summary also included information that "The Mexican Bureau of Political Investigation, a Communist non-governmental agency, in a recent issue of its bulletin declared that there are 'very suspicious indications' that U. S. cattle interests are responsible for the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Mexico." (1946)

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The analysis of the above incidents by [redacted] indicated that although BW was used mostly against groups of key individuals, that such activity did not mean that the potentialities of large scale BW were not realized. It was also indicated that many of the BW accusations were either deliberate falsehoods or resulted from an improper evaluation of intelligence. It was also pointed out that BW intelligence available to U. S. military personnel was inadequate and that the weakness was in the collection of adequate information.

Among [redacted] recommendations to improve this situation, he suggested placing espionage agents in foreign areas suspected of conducting BW research, that BW experts be sent abroad to obtain information, that personnel leaving the USSR be exploited, et cetera. The detailed report made by Wetter to the committee is attached to the minutes of this meeting as Exhibit A.

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* * *

[redacted] Office of Civil Defense Planning, summarized for the committee the history of U. S. civil defense planning since World War II. There was attached to the minutes of this meeting a copy of a National Security Resources Board document, No. 112, dated

June 6, 1949, entitled "A Report on Civil Defense Planning," which reportedly covers the history and present status of the planning in the civil defense field. This document has been previously analyzed and no further analysis will be made at this time unless you advise to the contrary. This document is attached as Appendix B to the minutes of this meeting.

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The Drafting Panel submitted a draft of the committee's final report for consideration by the full committee. It is noted that revisions were desired and individual members were instructed to submit any additional changes to [redacted] prior to the preparation of the report in its final form. A copy of the Drafting Panel's revision of the covering letter, "Major Findings," and "Recommendations for Action by the Secretary of Defense" is attached to the minutes as Appendix C.

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Under the heading, "Exchange of Information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation," [redacted] reported to the committee that to date no reply had been received from the FBI to the committee's letter of May 25, 1949. (You will recall that in this letter [redacted] requested that a meeting be arranged whereby Bureau representatives brief designated members of the committee on matters relating to the Communist underground in the United States. This letter was not answered. Admiral Sauers was briefed in the captioned matter, and an over-all memorandum on Communist Party organization, which included data on the Communist underground, was forwarded to all members of NSC and [redacted] in lieu of making any response to [redacted])

The committee noted certain documents which had been circulated to the members for information. One of these documents, referred to as an extract from the Quarterly Review of BW Intelligence, First Quarter, 1949, was published by the Central Intelligence Agency. This document contains information reflecting the interest of the USSR in plague and "enteric (pertaining to the intestines) agents" as BW agents. This excerpt points out that a Soviet defector had previously furnished information that the Soviets were incompetent in developing penicillin. However, it was indicated in the excerpt that there was no reason to believe that the Soviets are also incompetent in their development of BW.

This excerpt also contains the statement that there is an indication that the USSR is making ^{USSR} defense plans against BW. Information relating to the reported use of BW agents in Palestine by the Jewish

forces against the British and BW research in Yugoslavia, Chile and Java is set forth in this excerpt.

Another document noted by the committee as having been circulated to the committee members for information was an extract from the "Rand Working Paper on Biological Warfare," which discusses the following civil defense functions in relation to BW:

- Education of the population
- Warning of attack
- Medical and Public Health
- Facilities for Emergency
- Recruitment and Training of
- Volunteer Civil Defense Personnel
- Quarantine and Evacuation, and
- Police Problems.

Copies of the aforementioned documents are attached as Exhibits E and F.

* * *

The Secretary requested that committee members return all Classified material which they had received in connection with the committee's activities, after they signed the final report, to the Secretary of Defense.

STATUS

The final meeting of this committee was to be held on June 25, 1949 at the Pentagon Building.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Attachments.

FROM

DO-7

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson ☒ ()
Mr. Clegg ☐ ()
Mr. Glavin ☒ ()
Mr. Ladd ☒ ()
Mr. Nichols ☐ ()
Mr. Rosen ☐ ()
Mr. Tracy ☐ ()
Mr. Gurnea ☐ ()
Mr. Harbo ☐ ()
Mr. Mohr ☐ ()
Mr. Nease ☐ ()
Miss Gandy ☐ ()

What about
the matter re-
ferred to on P3.
Can we locate
the letter of

See Me ☐ ()
Note and Return ☐ ()
For Your Recommendation ☐ ()
What are the facts? ☐ ()
Remarks:

May 25th un-
answered. I
thought we had
agreed to a meeting with

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/19/04 BY 60267NLS/KJS/DA

RNP

100-93216-203

ENCLOSURE

to
memo
7/6/49
H/BK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: July 6, 1949

Tolson _____

Clegg _____

Glavin _____

Nichols _____

Rosen _____

Tracy _____

Harbo _____

Mohr _____

Tele. Room _____

Nease _____

PURPOSE

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you why the letter of May 25, 1949, from [redacted] has been unanswered.

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BACKGROUND

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In a letter dated May 25, 1949, [redacted] requested that a meeting be arranged between [redacted] and [redacted] Policy Planning Division, Department of State, and appropriate officials of the Bureau to give the committee an opportunity to report directly to the FBI its findings to date concerning the technical potentialities for biological warfare sabotage within the United States and to give the committee, through its two designated representatives, a proper appreciation of the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the underground within the United States.

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In a memorandum dated May 31, 1949, it was recommended that [redacted] and Unit Chief [redacted] meet with the two indicated representatives of the Committee.

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By routing slip which cannot presently be located, you suggested that [redacted] be briefed.

OBSERVATIONS

There is no indication that you agreed with the recommendation for a meeting with [redacted]. You also suggested that [redacted] be briefed on a memorandum dated June 10, 1949, relating to this same subject matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/01 BY 60320/UC

On June 13, 1949, [redacted] was contacted by Liaison Agent [redacted] and he advised that the Committee will become more or less inoperative when the final report is submitted. At that time the Committee had only two more meetings, one June 14, and another June 25, 1949.

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By memorandum dated June 20, 1949, the results of the contact with [redacted] was furnished to you. At that time it was pointed out that a memorandum dealing with Communist Party organization and activities, including the underground organization of the Communist Party, was being

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prepared so that it could be distributed to members of the National Security Council. This distribution was planned to be made prior to June 25, and actually the memorandum was prepared and was ready for distribution June 24, 1949. In the memorandum of June 20, 1949, it was recommended that in view of the fact that such memorandum would cover the material and would be in the hands of the National Security Council prior to June 25, it was recommended that no additional oral briefing be considered for [] and his Committee members. You agreed with this recommendation.

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ACTION:

It is recommended that through [] be advised that the comprehensive memorandum dealing with Communist Party organization and activities, including the underground organization of the Communist Party, has been made available to members of the National Security Council, so that if he is still interested in receiving such material he can arrange to have access to it.

BK, also check
with [] as to
our position in this
matter & make
certain he approves.

gl

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H.

Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 11, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/04 BY 60267UC/NIS/BJM/RNB

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Carson ✓
Mr. Egan ✓
Mr. Gurnea ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Hendon ✓
Mr. Pennington ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Holmes ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

PURPOSE

To inform you of the results of the eighth and last conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country.

This conference was held on June 25, 1949, at the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., and was attended by members of the regular committee and [redacted] Weapons System Evaluation Group, National Military Establishment.

BACKGROUND

You will recall that this is the committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of former Secretary of Defense [redacted] of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional warfare. You will recall that I have furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of this committee are questionable from a security standpoint.

RESULTS OF EIGHTH CONFERENCE (6/25/49)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau liaison representative on July 1, 1949, the minutes of the eighth and last meeting of this committee which are attached for your information. From a review of these minutes the following activity was noted.

The committee considered the final draft of its report to the Secretary of Defense. Changes were made and the committee endorsed the general form and content of the final report. The final report was to be typed on July 6, 1949, and presented to the Secretary of Defense by [redacted] during the week of July 11, 1949.

[redacted] Weapons System Evaluation Group, National Military Establishment, gave a brief discussion of the organization and method of operation of his group and indicated its general approach to CEBAR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare). According to [redacted] this group was established to provide "rigorous, unprejudiced and independent analyses and evaluations of present and future weapons systems under probable future combat conditions." [redacted] advised

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that this group does not prepare war plans but rather the background for such plans. The group consists of a mixed team of military and civilian personnel and serves as technical advisor to the top staff of the National Military Establishment.

[redacted] Chemical Corps, Department of the Army, gave a brief outline of the work being done at Edgewood Arsenal in the field of chemical warfare with particular attention to developments in nerve gases.

[redacted] advised that more potent chemical warfare agents have been developed by the Army as a result of information and materials obtained from the Germans. These agents cause death by inhaling or by contact with the skin. Detection of, and protection against, these agents is difficult and is being studied by the Army.

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Under the heading, "Exchange of Information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation", the secretary [redacted] reported that to date no reply had been received from the FBI to the committee's letter of May 25, 1949. With reference to this letter, [redacted] has been orally advised that the Bureau forwarded to all members of the National Security Council a summary relating to the Communist Party under date of June 24, 1949, and that this summary would be responsive to the committee's interest.

A report of a conference between the National Military Establishment and the U. S. Department of Agriculture on the protection of American agriculture was circulated for information of members of the committee. This report, dated June 15, 1949, prepared as a memorandum for the Chairman, Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment, contained the following recommendations which are briefly set forth for your information.

In the interest of national security, the conference recommended a program for the protection of important food crops, livestock and poultry against the possible introduction of injurious insect pests and plant and animal pathogens (an organism that gives origin to disease). It was recommended that in order to supplement existing measures for the protection of crops, livestock and poultry that the program for protection be constituted by the following principal points:

1. To strengthen the Division of Foreign Plant Quarantines, especially at ports of entry, to prevent intentional as well as accidental introduction into the United States of foreign insect pests and plant diseases.

2. A joint insect pest and plant disease reporting service be established to insure prompt discovery and identification of injurious insect pests and plant diseases new to the United States, as well as prompt detection of any outbreaks of

established pests and diseases.

3. The development of specific plans whereby immediate and effective countermeasures could be applied upon the discovery of outbreaks of those foreign insect pests and plant diseases most likely to be employed by any hostile agency.

4. That world literature on foreign insect pests and plant diseases be reviewed and analyzed and published in useful form; that such information be maintained current and distributed to Federal, state, territorial and local agencies.

5. Obtain information concerning foreign insect pests and plant pathogens which might be useful in the development of control and eradication of such agents.

6. That legislation be sought to prohibit or control the importation of injurious foreign insect pests and plant pathogens; to control the importation of soil; to prohibit the unauthorized importation or disposal in the territorial waters of the U. S. refuse derived from products originating outside the continental United States.

7. An agency for the recollection and dissemination of information on plant diseases within the United States, its territories and contiguous countries be set up.

8. Means be provided for acquiring world-wide information on animal diseases and animal population.

9. To strengthen the inspection and quarantine service of the Bureau of Animal Industry.

10. To reestablish facilities for research on the following animal diseases:

- a. Rinderpest
- b. Foot-and-Mouth Disease
- c. Newcastle
- d. Fowl Plague

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Various members of the committee expressed an interest in setting up a mechanism whereby sources of CEBAR (Chemical, biological and radiological warfare) information believed to be currently available abroad would be thoroughly examined.

[redacted] State Department, stated that the Department of State was prepared to establish an office in Germany expressly for the purpose of interrogating displaced persons and refugees who had crossed into the Western Zones from the Soviet area of occupation. The committee recommended that [redacted]

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[] write an informal memorandum to [] suggesting that []
[] Committee on Biological Warfare, Research and Development Board, be
considered for possible temporary duty with the Department of State as a
specialist on CEBAR matters.

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The Chairman [] informed the committee that when t
members were ready to turn in the classified material which they had received
in connection with the committee's activities, they should notify []
[] who would make the necessary arrangement to have the material
picked up. It is noted that [] has not requested the return of any of the
classified documents which were furnished to the Bureau as enclosures to the
minutes of the meetings in the captioned matter. These documents will not be
returned unless [] asks for their return, at which time you will be
immediately advised.

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ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher

DATE: July 19, 1949

FROM : [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director, dated July 6, 1949, concerning a letter dated May 25, 1949 from [REDACTED] requesting a meeting between representatives of the Bureau and representatives of the BW Committee for the purpose of giving the Committee a briefing of the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the Communist underground within the United States. It was recommended that [REDACTED] be advised through liaison that the comprehensive memorandum dealing with Communist Party organization and activities including the underground organization of the Party has been made available to members of the National Security Council, so that if he is still interested in receiving such material, he can arrange to have access to it. The Director made the following notation, "O.K., also check with Souers as to our position in this matter and make certain he approves. H."

Accordingly, [REDACTED] was contacted on July 14, 1949 (he was unavailable before that time) and he was advised of the Bureau's position in this matter. [REDACTED] stated that he agreed with the Bureau's position and indicated that it would be satisfactory for the Bureau to advise [REDACTED] that the memorandum on Communism had been furnished the members of the National Security Council, and that he might be able to arrange to have access to it. Therefore, [REDACTED] was so advised, and he indicated appreciation for the information and stated he would arrange to see a copy of this memorandum in the event he felt it would be necessary.

You will be kept advised of any further developments in connection with the BW Program.

RWL:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/04 BY 60267WJ/NGS/CJA/RNP

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JUL 22 1949

MR. H. B. FLETCHER

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June 1, 1949

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[REDACTED]
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (FAS)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
O
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the results of a telephone call received by
Supervisor [REDACTED] at 12:00 noon on this date from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Room 2B746, Pentagon Building.

SUBSTANCE OF THE CALL

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[REDACTED] advised that he had just learned that a "paper" on
biological warfare was being circulated in or by the Federation of American
Scientists and he asked if the Bureau could furnish the Intelligence
Division of the Army any information concerning this matter. He stated
that he had no other details at the moment but he was checking into this
matter further. It was suggested to [REDACTED] that our liaison agent
contact him and secure more details concerning the information he desired
and secure any additional information he subsequently was able to obtain
regarding this matter, to which he agreed.

You will recall that the FAS is composed of various groups of
scientists throughout the United States whose national headquarters is
in Washington, D. C. Our investigation of the FAS has determined there
is no Communist infiltration on a national scale. However, some local
chapters have been reported to be Communist infiltrated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Liaison Section determine from [REDACTED] more details
as to the author of the report, its title, where circulated, by whom, etc.,
in order that we can more logically inquire into this matter.

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It is recommended that this memorandum also be referred to
Supervisor [REDACTED] who is handling the investigation of the FAS
to determine whether such information has been previously reported and,
if not, to have the WFO through their informants secure this information.

b7C

Tele. CC: Biological Warfare File ✓

Tolson _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Egan _____
Gurnea _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Pennington _____
Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/22/04 BY 60322/UC/ATP/ENP

1100-93216-1
NOT RECORDED
62 SEP 27 1949

INITIALS ON PRECEDENT

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-34452-264X

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 10, 1949

FROM : D. M. LADD *DL*SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFAREPURPOSE

To inform you of the results of the sixth conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemy of this country and to inform you of the results of a review of the Bureau's files on [redacted] the Chemical Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, and [redacted] Psychology Department, Yale University, who attended the fifth meeting of this committee on May 14, 1949.

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The sixth meeting was held at the Pentagon Building on May 27, 1949, and was attended by members of the regular committee and by [redacted] Chemical Corps, Department of the Army [redacted] Carnegie Institute of Washington, D.C., and [redacted] Camp Detrick, Maryland, (Army B.W. Center). (Bureau files are presently being reviewed on these three persons and you will be furnished with any pertinent information concerning them.)

BACKGROUND

You will recall that this is the committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of [redacted] of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional warfare. In connection with this program, [redacted] has reportedly secured the assistance of [redacted] I have previously furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of this Committee are at least questionable from a loyalty standpoint.

RESULTS OF SIXTH CONFERENCE (MAY 25, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on June 7, 1949, the minutes of the sixth meeting of this committee which are attached for your information. From a review of these minutes prepared by [redacted] the following activity was noted:

The Committee considered the minutes of their fifth meeting (May 14, 1949). [redacted] of the Carnegie Institute, Washington, D. C., observed that paragraph seven of the minutes of May 14, 1949, entitled

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50 AUG 26 1949

*Suggest**be brief**Done 6/13/49**S. K. W.**see memo to Fletcher 6/13/49*

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/04 BY 60267UC/NLS/BJM/KWP

"Information Desired From the Federal Bureau of Investigation." did not fully reflect the Committee's position. He emphasized that during the discussion at the fifth meeting, the Committee agreed that it had a two-fold responsibility. First, to be absolutely certain that the FBI was fully informed of the Committee's findings with respect to the technical potentialities for biological warfare, sabotage within the United States; and second, to attempt to evaluate for the Secretary of Defense, "the dangers which biological warfare may pose for the United States, directly as a weapon of sabotage or combat, and indirectly as a political-military weapon at home and abroad." Any discussion which might be arranged between the Committee's chairman and [redacted] and appropriate representatives of the FBI should attempt to fulfill at least the first responsibility regardless of whether or not the FBI is prepared to furnish the Committee background information to assist it in carrying out its assigned task. The Committee agreed with [redacted] and the minutes were changed accordingly.

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[redacted] Carnegie Institute, Washington, D. C., then pointed out to the Committee the fact that by the expenditure of a very small B. W. sabotage effort, an enemy could force the United States to divert a large amount of effort to counter the enemies action. [redacted] cited as an example that if a few water supplies were contaminated, a large effort would be required to guard and check other water supplies.

[redacted] further indicated that such action need not produce any major effect but that all that is required is a diversion of some of our effort into non-productive channels. According to [redacted] this type of activity is attractive to Russian tactics and strategy. It would require few sabotage agents and it would not involve any risk of reprisals with atomic bombs. [redacted] pointed out that our number one objective is to detect and to defend against such an attack. He suggested that as a defense, a study should be made of the methods by which this country or western Europe could be most easily attacked; further, that centers be established for promptly identifying any outbreaks of disease, and that preparations be made for large scale production of Sera and for mass inoculations.

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A copy of a memorandum prepared by [redacted] concerning the matters discussed above is attached to the minutes of this meeting as appendix B.

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[redacted] presented to the Committee a paper which he had prepared entitled, "An Approach to the Economic Effects of Biological Warfare," a copy of which is attached as appendix C to

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to the minutes of this meeting. [] emphasized the exceptional elasticity of our agricultural economy, and pointed out that if pressed, we could probably increase our agricultural output anywhere from 30% to 50%. Furthermore, considering the fact that no food group provides more than one-fifth of all nutrients making up the U.S. civilian diet, [] felt that it would be extremely difficult for an enemy to make any serious impact on our normal economy through BW attacks on our food sources. On the other hand, countries which are essentially dependent upon a single crop for their food supply are particularly vulnerable, as for example: populations existing almost entirely in a "cereal economy" as in China or Mongolia, or on potatoes as in Central Europe. These considerations apply to sabotage operations during peace or "cold war". During an all-out atomic war, however, attacks on our food supply might have much more serious repercussions.

The Committee then discussed the drafting of its final report and agreed to study the working papers presented by the drafting panel with a view toward crystallizing their thinking on the subject matter of the final report prior to the next meeting, at which time the drafting panel would present a complete draft for the consideration of the full committee.


Under the heading "Exchange of Information with the FBI" [] reported that at the suggestion of the Bureau's liaison representative, he had prepared a memorandum to you for the Committee requesting that a meeting be arranged between Bureau officials and the Committee's [] Department of State representative to the Committee. The purpose of the meeting, according to [] being to afford the Committee an opportunity to report its findings re BW directly to the FBI and giving the Committee through its representatives a proper appreciation of the strength, capabilities, and probable intentions of the underground within the United States.

A copy of [] memorandum to you is attached to the minutes of this meeting as appendix E, which you will recall has already been furnished to us by our liaison agent.

PERTINENT INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A REVIEW OF THE BUREAU'S FILES ON PERSONS ATTENDING THE MEETING OF THIS COMMITTEE ON May 14, 1949

[]
According to a confidential informant believed to be reliable []


Party which subsequently became the Workers Party was held at Moose Hall, Chester Street, Cleveland, Ohio, on February 24, 1940. According to the Assistant Manager of the Gillis Hotel, Cleveland, Ohio, a Mr. and Mrs.



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An anonymous postcard dated September 30, 1940, received by the Bureau stated that [redacted] seemed [redacted] to be a Communist. (100-0-1470)

You may recall that in April, 1948, the Baltimore Sun published an alleged account of an interview by an Agent of the Baltimore Office with a Dr. Carl P. Swanson, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, concerning an investigation of a student at that University named John Paul Trinkhaus. Dr. Swanson and Dr. Bowman, President of the University, subsequently informed the Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office that Swanson had been misquoted in the article and Dr. Bowman expressed his regrets for the occurrence of the article.



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(100-355689)

STATUS

The next meeting of the Committee was scheduled for June 11, 1949, at [redacted]

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ACTION

There is attached hereto for your approval a blind memorandum containing the derogatory information concerning [redacted] to be confidentially furnished to [redacted] of the National Security Council through liaison. [redacted] should be advised by the Bureau's Liaison Agent that [redacted] attended the meeting of this Committee held on May 14, 1949. The information concerning [redacted] is not being furnished to [redacted]

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Attachment

Delivered personally
To [redacted] *7/14/49*
Kee

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*Insert
Attachment
+ attach before
filing.*


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/04 BY 60267UC/NLS/BJA/RNP

mct

100-93216-211

CHANGED TO

65-58698-30X



CC-150
MW

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1949

URGENT
CODE 221 UNDERLINED

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

MW

RE: DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. REURLET

AUGUST TWENTY-TWO, NINETEEN FORTY-NINE. FURNISH BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEE REFERRED TO IN YOUR REFERENCED
LETTER, AMSD.

HOOVER

EXM:ma
mm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/STP/RNP

Eene mw
2315-2320

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100-93216-212
FBI

31 SEP 13 1949

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED

RECEIVED
SEP 1 1 13 PM '49

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

SEP 1 1949

2 SEP 10 1949

SENT VIA

7:42 PM

RECEIVED
SEP 1 6 26 PM '49
Per *sk*

August 23, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

gm
[Redacted]
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

b6

Attention: [Redacted]

b6

b7C

[Redacted] Ad Hoc Committee of the
Secretary of Defense on Biological [Redacted] b7C ro

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to the ~~secret~~ report of the Secretary of Defense's
Ad Hoc Committee on Biological Warfare dated July 11, 1949.

I have reviewed the above report and at this time, in view of the
statements contained therein relating to this Bureau, I wish to advise you
as follows:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been alert to the sabotage
potentialities of Biological Warfare for many years. Our field offices
throughout the United States and in Alaska, Puerto Rico and Hawaii have been
for some time alerted to these potentialities.

As you know, the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
is in the United States and in the territories of the United States named above.
In this connection we are maintaining close liaison with the other intelligence
agencies of the United States Government in order to keep them advised of all
pertinent information of interest to them relating to the internal security of
this country and in order that this Bureau can be kept fully informed of any
information coming to the attention of these agencies which is within the
jurisdiction of this Bureau.

RECORDED - 76 1100-93216-213
The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be glad to receive any
pertinent information relating to Biological Warfare sabotage potentialities
from any of the agencies of the National Military Establishment.

Sincerely yours,
RECEIVED - 11 SEP 1949

28 3 33 BH

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DECLASSIFIED BY 100-70C/HLS/ATA/ENP
ON 7/27/04

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

51 SEP 20 1949

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

b7C

DECLASSIFIED
ON 7/22/04

ST-XET

REC'D 9 07 AM '71
RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

mm
1949

Date: September 16, 1949

To: Director of Special Investigations (I.G.)
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

It is the desire of this Bureau at this time to bring to your attention a matter of vital importance concerning the type of information needed by this Bureau in connection with our investigative jurisdiction in the captioned matter.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been aware of the sabotage potentialities of Biological Warfare for many years. Our Field Offices have been for some time alerted to these potentialities.

In order that this Bureau can more efficiently and intelligently carry out its investigative responsibilities in this field, it is requested that we be kept currently advised of all information relating to Biological Warfare which will enable us to recognize potential techniques and to locate in the United States and in the territories under our jurisdiction any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage agents.

Your cooperation and assistance in this matter will indeed be appreciated.

CC - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

EX-9

EHM:lfc

SEP 20 1949

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9/19/49 - 2
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JH

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b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

Date: September 16, 1949

To: [Redacted]

Attention: [Redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

It is the desire of this Bureau at this time to bring to your attention a matter of vital importance concerning the type of information needed by this Bureau in connection with our investigative jurisdiction in the captioned matter.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been aware of the sabotage potentialities of Biological Warfare for many years. Our Field Offices have been for some time alerted to these potentialities.

In order that this Bureau can more efficiently and intelligently carry out its investigative responsibilities in this field, it is requested that we be kept currently advised of the following types of information regarding Biological Warfare in foreign countries which comes to the attention of your agency: Information concerning the use, the reported use or prospective use of Biological Warfare by sabotage agents; the discovery and/or development of new Biological Warfare Agents; the identity and location of existing Biological Warfare Research Centers; information concerning the construction of new Biological Research Centers, particularly in this hemisphere; and the identity of foreigners who contemplate visiting the United States who are known to your agency as having been associated with Biological Warfare Research abroad.

Your cooperation and assistance in this matter will indeed be appreciated.

RECORDED - 110

EHM:lfc

EX-9

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60667UC/US/BJA/ENP
ON 7/22/04
Pg. 1, OCA 7/26/04 60667UC/US/BJA/ENP

100-93216-216
SEP 21 1949
HBF

copy:ahs

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

September 9, 1949

TO : [REDACTED] b6
FROM : [REDACTED] b7C

SUBJECT: FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (FAS)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Reference is made to a memorandum to Mr. Fletcher from [REDACTED] in the above-captioned matter dated June 1, 1949, which indicates that [REDACTED] of the Intelligence Division, advised [REDACTED] that he had learned that a "paper" on biological warfare was being circulated by the Federation of American Scientists. He inquired as to whether or not the Bureau could furnish any information regarding this matter. The referenced memorandum recommended that the Liaison Section obtain more details as to the author of the report, etc.

b6
b7C

A copy of a "paper" on biological warfare prepared by the Federation of American Scientists was brought to the attention of the Bureau by [REDACTED] of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pursuant to an oral request of [REDACTED] this "paper" has been shown to [REDACTED] by the writer at which time [REDACTED] was requested to review the document and advise as to whether or not it contained any classified information.

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[REDACTED] has been recontacted and has advised that he has not completely reviewed the "paper."

This matter will be followed with [REDACTED] and you will be advised of any information obtained.

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b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this be forwarded to the Espionage Section for the attention of [REDACTED]

SWR:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/20/04 BY 60267 UC/NW/BTR/RNP

*See unrecorded
Aval between serials
228+229,
Eftm*

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ORIGINAL NO FURTHER

100-93212
NOT RECORDED
SEP 27 1949

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-344572-270

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

Date: September 16, 1949

To: Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60327UC/NLS/ETX/RNP
ON 7/22/04

Attention: Chief, Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

It is the desire of this Bureau at this time to bring to your attention a matter of vital importance relating to the type of information needed by this Bureau in connection with our investigative jurisdiction in the captioned matter.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been aware of the sabotage potentialities of Biological Warfare for many years. Our Field Offices have been for some time alerted to these potentialities.

In order that this Bureau can more efficiently and intelligently carry out its investigative responsibilities in this field, it is requested that we be kept currently advised of all information relating to Biological Warfare which will enable us to recognize potential techniques and to locate in the United States and in the territories under our jurisdiction any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage agents. In addition, it is suggested that a liaison arrangement be instituted between this Bureau and representatives of the Army's Biological Warfare Research Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland, in order that we may be furnished with the latest developments and discoveries in the Biological Warfare Field which may relate to our sabotage responsibilities.

Your cooperation and assistance in this matter will be indeed appreciated.

EHM:lfc

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RECORDED - 2

100-93216-217

23 SEP 22 1949

52 OCT 21-49
IDA.
T-21-49

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 SEP 1949

CSGID IS 385-Biological

*Rec'd from IDA
9-14-49 CWB*

b6

b7C

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

file in Biological Warfare

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter of 8 August 1949, Subject: Biological Warfare, and enclosure thereto entitled "Report of the Fas Committee on Biological Warfare."

The reference enclosure has been reviewed and it is the opinion of the Intelligence Division that this document does not contain information which is ~~classified~~. It is believed that the discussion in this paper covers items which can be found in press articles, books and other public releases.

Sincerely yours,

b6

b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/04 BY 60262UCB/SP/ANP

Chief, Intelligence Group
Intelligence Division, G-2

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17 SEP 27 1949

EX-15

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57 OCT 5 1949

THE U. S. ARMY -- PART OF THE TEAM -- FOR SECURITY

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO *RB*

FROM : D. J. PARSONS *P*

DATE: July 15, 1949

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
SABOTAGE AND COUNTERSABOTAGE RESEARCH
CAMP DETRICK, MARYLAND

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b6

b7C

As advised by [redacted] memorandum to [redacted] dated July 8, 1949, [redacted] came to the Laboratory yesterday afternoon concerning his assignment on a bacteriological warfare project and in company with SA [redacted] I talked with him.

[redacted] laboratory will have a staff of approximately 50 to 75, that the buildings will be completed at Camp Detrick, Maryland, and they presently have a project planned which they will revise based on the request of any government agency having an interest. As presently set up aside from the laboratory group, there will be field groups which will make actual simulation tests of some of the methods either developed by them or which the intelligence information indicates a potential enemy nation might use. As an example of this, they are planning a test in the Pentagon Building whereby a field group will put some material in the air conditioning system in order that they can detect it and estimate the effectiveness should air borne bacteria actually be used. In this connection [redacted] referred to defense plans necessary to avoid such attacks whether on the Pentagon, Atomic Energy installations, public utilities, or industrial groups, and asked if the FBI would participate in recommending defensive plans. [redacted] that we would not, that we had no policing or guarding responsibilities. He also wanted to know if we would participate in field group trials and mentioned that his thinking along that line resulted from tests made by field groups after plant surveys during the last war. I told [redacted] the FBI did not participate in any "field tests" and would not. I explained to him that we did make plant surveys but that any tests such as he mentioned were made after that program was taken over by the military or by agencies other than the FBI.

Their plans also call for an intelligence group to be set up which will have the responsibility of obtaining information of assistance to the project and disseminating information which they develop. [redacted] said that although this group had not yet been set up, any information the FBI desired or desired to furnish could now be directed to [redacted]

RECORDED - 51

INDEXED - 51

EX-119

100-92216-211

60 OCT 12 1949

DJP/mek

means Fletcher
9-11-49
me

CHAM
1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/04 BY 60367UC/HLS/AM/KSP

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. Harbo
Re: Bacteriological Warfare
Special Operations Division
Sabotage and Countersabotage Research
Camp Detrick, Maryland

[redacted] b6

b7C

I do think [redacted] is more level headed than those with whom we have discussed this matter before. He has obviously made a study of the background of this work insofar as the military is concerned. He said that many very impractical things had been suggested as approaches. He feels that rather than any effort by enemy agents to bring a sufficient amount of bacteria or virus into this country for use, it is much more likely that an infectious germ would be sent to the saboteur on a piece of dry paper which would then serve as the seed for a culture that the agent could make in about two weeks. He further stated that one of the laboratory projects would be to develop in a single suitcase the necessary equipment for a man to take even into a local hotel and culture sufficient bacteria to pump into the water system.

[redacted] said their sources of information indicate that the

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I told [redacted] that we had no request to make of his group at this time, that the FBI had jurisdiction in sabotage investigations, and any information coming to the attention of his group indicating sabotage or even attempts at sabotage through bacteriological methods or any other method should be immediately referred to us. He said he understood this and was wondering if we could supply him with a summary of sabotage activities or methods of operation of saboteurs. I told him that we did not have any such summary that we could furnish. I also told him that we would be interested in receiving any information their group learned of or developed concerning methods of sabotage through bacteriological methods to assist us in evaluating complaints that we receive.

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[redacted] was shown the Laboratory for which he was appreciative and assured me that he would not only advise the Bureau of any matter within our jurisdiction which came to his attention but also information which he felt would simply be of interest to us.

RB ✓
If we find him sound &
logical I have no objection
of keeping in touch with him.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: JULY 8, 1949

FROM : [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/04 BY 60267 u/nc/s/oom/rnp

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
SABOTAGE AND COUNTERSABOTAGE RESEARCH
CAMP DETRICK, MARYLAND

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[REDACTED] of the Biological Warfare Committee telephonically advised SA [REDACTED] that a [REDACTED] is here for the purpose of discussing problems in connection with the study of sabotage and its various potentialities from a biological warfare point of view.

On July 7, 1949 [REDACTED] was personally contacted by SA [REDACTED] and advised that he had discussed the matter in some detail with [REDACTED] stated that the Special Operations Division of the Research and Development Board now in the process of constructing a small laboratory at Camp Detrick. It is hoped that this laboratory and its facilities will be completed within a few months. The work to be conducted in this laboratory will consist of scientific research and tests to determine the feasibility and potentialities of sabotage using biological methods. [REDACTED] of this special unit at Camp Detrick and is presently contacting various interested agencies with a view to developing a plan of operation for his unit. [REDACTED] indicated to [REDACTED] that officials from the Oak Ridge Laboratory had already approached Camp Detrick and had expressed their concern over possible BW sabotage attacks on the Oak Ridge installation.

It was [REDACTED] opinion that it would be extremely useful as a steering committee could be set up composed of working level members from interested Government agencies which would give general planning guidance to the Special Operations Division. He also felt that his division should have a technical committee to which it could turn for advice of a scientific nature. These two committees could meet at regular intervals and give advice and direction to the division's anti-sabotage program.

[REDACTED] also discussed with [REDACTED] the possibility of making certain tests to determine the feasibility of spreading BW agents in aerosol form throughout sections of the Pentagon via the air conditioning system.

[REDACTED] stated that the special unit will also make studies in connection with countersabotage methods which could be employed by private industries with a view to anticipating possible sabotage by the enemy. A possible plan was discussed whereby private industry might through appropriate channels contact the special unit and present certain problems whereby the particular industry might be vulnerable to BW sabotage. The special unit would then conduct research into the matter and attempt to solve these problems for the particular industry.

[REDACTED] indicated that he would like to discuss the entire program with an

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INDEXED - 51

EX-119

60 OCT 12 1949

MEMO TO MR. H. B. FLETCHER

b6 appropriate Bureau representative to determine the Bureau's reaction and to receive
b7C any comments or suggestions that the Bureau might have in connection with this
program. [redacted] will return to Washington on July 14, 1949 and will be available
for conference at that time.

It would appear that such a program would be of great interest to the Bureau
and that it would be advantageous to the Bureau to be kept advised of the developments
made by this special unit. It would also appear that the scientific results of this
program might be such that the Bureau would desire to advise its own field offices of
BW sabotage possibilities and possible countersabotage measures. It is felt,
therefore, that this matter should be more thoroughly discussed with Dr. Schwab from a
scientific point of view.

RECOMMENDATION:

b6 It is therefore recommended that a representative of the Bureau Laboratory
b7C be designated to discuss this program with [redacted] on July 14, 1949 primarily for
the purpose of determining the technical details of the program and whether or not the
Bureau will have any interest in maintaining close contact with this unit. If you
approve, it is suggested that SA [redacted] be advised so that appropriate arrangements
can be made for the conference with [redacted]

RWF
I think OK -
we should listen
& not advise
7-11
✓
2 for merely to listen.
H.

[redacted]

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Addendum: 7-14-49

At 8:30 p.m., July 13, I talked with [] of the Technical Laboratory and advised him that [] wished to discuss with a Bureau representative sabotage potentialities with reference to biological warfare. I told him that [] indicated he would like to consult with a Bureau representative on July 14.

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At 9:15 a.m. today, I advised Special Agent [] that [] would be available during the day and it would be preferable to have [] come to [] office.

HBf:cmw

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 20, 1949

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/23/84 BY 10027WU/NUS/ATM/ENP

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Purpose:

To furnish you with a brief synopsis of the attached summary memorandum of the Report on Biological Warfare made by the Secretary of Defense's Ad Hoc Committee dated July 11, 1949.

Background:

You will recall that this is the Committee set up by [redacted] to study methods of unconventional warfare.

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Synopsis:

The importance and dangers of Biological Warfare are set forth. The Committee points out that present defense and research are not adequate. The report states that no agency of the United States Government has a clearly defined responsibility for the protection of the civil population against Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare (CEBAR).

Eleven major issues are considered by the Committee in connection with their study of CEBAR, warfare and recommendations concerning each are made by the Committee. Some of the more important issues considered and recommendations made are as follows. The Committee recommends that defensive aspects of BW be given increased emphasis in an expanded program. The Committee states that CEBAR weapons are uniquely suited for use in sabotage. According to the Committee, "The political and strategic considerations which would bear on a decision to employ sabotage need continuing study in the light of changing conditions and of the best available information about enemy intentions. Information about the capabilities of enemy agents in this country and their instructions are particularly pertinent for these analyses. Guidance in this area was sought by the Committee from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the Committee received no information to assist it in appraising the actual risks of CEBAR sabotage. However, the Committee hopes that through its policy of transmitting the information developed in its discussions to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it has alerted that organization to the hazards implicit in the potentialities of CEBAR weapons for sabotage."

[redacted] never requested data concerning instructions given to enemy agents re CEBAR and their ability to carry out such instructions. If he had asked for the information indicated in the report, it should not have

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53 OCT 12 1949

EHM:jo

Attachment

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been furnished to the Committee in view of the questionable background of some members of the Committee and because we would not want to reveal to [redacted] Committee operations of our double agents.

It should be noted that this Bureau has been aware of the dangers of BW sabotage long before this Committee came into existence, and field offices have been fully alerted to these dangers.)

The Committee recommends that intensive efforts should be directed to collecting intelligence in the CEBAR warfare field. The Committee also recommends that a research program on the public health aspects of BW should be started immediately. It is also recommended that a public information program on CEBAR weapons be undertaken immediately to educate the public. Under the heading "Defense versus CEBAR Warfare," the Committee points out that "in a clandestine attack, interception of the attacking force hinges upon the effectiveness of our internal security and in particular, on the efficiency of such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

Action:

None. The above is for your information.

9/4/49
Memo to Mr. Tolson re memo
from Mr. [redacted] 2/3/49

8/23/49
Letter to Sec. of Defense
& to [redacted] comm

I think we have to give this very special attention since [redacted] com. has tried to "pass buck" re its responsibilities in this rebd. I would like [redacted] [redacted] to study it & let me have memo as to what we are doing & what we should do to meet full responsibility in this matter.

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO *RB*

FROM : D. J. PARSONS *DJP*

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: September 27, 1949 *EB*

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

I have previously reported visits of [] to the Laboratory to keep us informed concerning his project in the field of bacteriological warfare. For the sake of the file, this is to report that on September 20, 1949, [] called at my office and brought with him [] who is the liaison officer between the military at the Pentagon and the laboratories of the project at Camp Detrick. He also brought [] who is in charge of the field tests such as they have been making at the Pentagon.

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These gentlemen were briefly shown around the Laboratory.

DJP/mek

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DATE 7/23/04 BY 60367UC/NLS/EOA/RMP

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37 OCT 5 1949

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61 OCT 11 1949

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: September 7, 1949

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
SABOTAGE AND COUNTERSABOTAGE RESEARCH
CAMP DETRICK, MARYLAND

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

You will recall that [redacted] came to the Bureau Laboratory on July 14, 1949 to discuss [redacted] head of the Bacteriological Warfare Research Project. This conference with [redacted] was summarized in a memorandum from Mr. Parsons to Mr. Harbo dated July 15, 1949.

In order to insure that the Bureau can get in touch with [redacted] when ever desirable, it has been ascertained that he can be reached at Camp Detrick, Maryland, by telephone by calling Frederick, Maryland, asking for Camp Detrick. Extension [redacted] He can also be reached at the office of [redacted] Room [redacted] Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps, Gravelly Point, Virginia. The telephone for this office is Extension [redacted] code [redacted] He can also be reached through the office of [redacted] Room [redacted] Pentagon Building, Extension [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to Mr. Parsons and [redacted] for their information.

RWL:mk

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RECORDED - 9

37 OCT 5 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/23/04 BY 60327 uch/efm

56 OCT 11 1949

VE OFFICE OF THE P
TIONAL SECURITY COUN
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated August 23, 1949, wherein you advise that the FBI will be glad to receive any pertinent information relating to Biological Warfare sabotage potentialities from any of the agencies under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council.

There are presently three such agencies under the jurisdiction of the NSC, namely, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). In the case of the latter committee, it is my understanding that the general subject of unconventional attack is scheduled for consideration by the members of the ICIS at their next meeting. At that time NSC Representative on Internal Security, will inform the ICIS membership of the content of your communication. In the case of the IIC and the CIA, since you are a member of both the IIC and the IAC, I presume that, if you deem it appropriate, you will communicate directly with those committees relative to this matter.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

*Letters have
gone to IDA, ONI,
ICSI-AF and CIA
LW*

Honorable John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

#977600

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DATE 7/23/04 BY 10267UC/NLS/COA/RMP

100-73216-225
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6 OCT 5 1949

EX-100

OCT 12 1949



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

DATE: October 18, 1950

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM :

[Redacted]

VPK A

b6

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

b7C

Tolson ✓
 Ladd ✓
 Clegg ✓
 Glavin ✓
 Nichols ✓
 Rosen ✓
 Tracy ✓
 Harbo ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Mohr ✓

aVB

✓

RH
AG

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section for their information.

Enclosure

SWR:hb hb

JL

No

1/13/04
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 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 4/13/2029
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100-93216-366
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 34

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 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

5-ETH

276
 5 OCT 28 1950

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 19 1950

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____

WASH FROM NEW YORK 49 A 19 1041 P

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

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b7C

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESP - SABOTAGE. BUFILE ONE HUNDRED - NINE
THREE TWO ONE SIX. LETTER WILL BE SUBMITTED OCT. TWENTY NEXT.

SCHEIDT

HOLD

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OCT 23 1950

37

276 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/04 BY 60262 uc/alz/BJA/CB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

FROM : A. H. Belmont *Sh* *Hog's death of*

SUBJECT: ~~ABNORMAL LOSS OF HOGS~~ IN NEBRASKA AND ILLINOIS

DATE: October 19, 1950

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Nease ☒

Gandy ☒

PURPOSE

To advise no evidence of sabotage was developed in the captioned matter and this case is being closed.

BACKGROUND

You will recall this investigation was based on information received from Congressman Karl Stefan of Nebraska to the effect that large numbers of hogs in the Middle West were dying following inoculation against cholera.

The Omaha, Chicago, and Springfield Offices conducted investigations and no evidences of sabotage were developed.

As a result of extensive studies and research by the Department of Agriculture and similar circumstances which occurred during the past two summers, the conclusion has been reached that the excessive number of deaths of hogs has been caused by what is known as a "variant" which is, in laboratory terms, an "atypical virus."

All individuals interviewed stated it was not logical or justifiable in the absence of any specific allegation or indication of such to assume there is any actual sabotage by anyone. It was the belief of the individuals interviewed that the "Variant virus" together with local conditions and the physical conditions of the hogs being vaccinated are the contributing factors causing the abnormal death rate.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the publicity given to this matter and the request from Congressman Stefan, it is suggested copies of reports reflecting the results of the FBI investigation be directed to the Criminal Division for any further action it may desire taken. If you approve, there is attached a memorandum to the Criminal Division together with copies of the investigative reports.

Attachments
KFL:jgh

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RECEIVED - OCT 20 1950
OCT 20 1950
278

RECORDED - 46
INDEXED - 46

OCT 27 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60262 UC/MS/B/CB

G.H.B.
348132
5-28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT BUREAU

FILE NO. 62-4536

REPORT MADE AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	DATE WHEN MADE 10-10-50	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 9-27-50	REPORT MADE BY [redacted]
TITLE UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted] - INFORMANT			CHARACTER OF CASE MISCELLANEOUS MATTER
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: [redacted] on 9-12-50 wrote to the Director relating general circumstances regarding [redacted] [redacted] interviewed and full details determined.			
DETAILS: AT ASHTON, ILLINOIS: This investigation was initiated upon receipt of a letter from the Director requesting the Chicago Office to interview [redacted] [redacted] who had on September 12, 1950, written to the Bureau, informing that [redacted]			
APPROVED AND FORWARDED: [signature] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE			
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 3 - Bureau 2 - Omaha 2 - Chicago			

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AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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DATE 12-05-01 BY 60327 UC/NLS/BA/1006

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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HEREIN IS UN

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10-11-11

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b6
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INDEXED

EX-100

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b7C

Chicago File #62-4536

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

REFERENCE: Letter from Director to Chicago dated September 20,
1950.

Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney
Criminal Division

October 19, 1950

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 4

INDEXED - 4

ABNORMAL LOSS OF HOGS IN
NEBRASKA AND ILLINOIS

On September 12, 1950, Congressman Carl Stefan of Norfolk, Nebraska, expressed concern over the recent abnormal death rate of hogs following vaccination for hog cholera. Investigation has been conducted by this Bureau and no evidence of sabotage has been developed to date.

For your information in regard to the captioned matter, there is attached one copy each of the following reports reflecting the results of investigation conducted:

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated September 28, 1950, at Omaha, Nebraska.

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated September 26, 1950, at Springfield, Illinois.

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated October 10, 1950, at Chicago, Illinois.

No further investigation is being conducted by this Bureau pending receipt of additional instructions from you. A prompt reply in this regard would be appreciated.

Attachments

EFL:jdt

OCT 20 10 49 AM '50

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 1/13/04

October 12, 1950

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

b7C

11/20/30
Following to
BF + Bette
Eman

meg

4/4/50
SF + Balto
Oct. W. W. W. W. W.
Sect Lake city w/o in 11/50.
Sect Lake city w/o in 11/50.
Balto to be in by 12/50.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/03 BY 60267 uc/nls/dja/crb

RECEIVED-READING ROOM
OCT 19 10 31 AM '50
FBI
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

51 NOV 1 1950
OCT 19 1950

RECORDED
EX-89

PERS. FILES

-b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DATE: August 22, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b7C

Rebulet 8/16/50.

This is to advise that SA [] of this office is being designated Liaison Agent with representatives of the Army's Biological Warfare Test Center at Camp Dugway, Utah.

JCN:FR
65-1122

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb
ON 11/13/04

*memo to Belmont
8-30-50
EHM*

100-93216-57
RECORDED 103-1/04-93216
AUG 28 1950
EX-52

51 OCT 30 1950

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 10/30/50

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

ReBulet 10/18/50.

Inasmuch as SA [] attended courses of instruction in connection with the above-captioned matter during the week of October 23, 1950, it is assumed that he will have been furnished with all up to date developments in this field.

No regular liaison contact with Camp Detrick will be made by Baltimore, and it is suggested that Agent [] furnish the Baltimore Office with a copy of any report reflecting new information he obtained during the period of his instruction.

Baltimore will recontact liaison representatives on Bacteriological Warfare at Camp Detrick no later than 11/15/50.

EGG:DEP
66-891

RECORDED - 127

100-93216-372
OCT 31 1950

3

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 1/13/04

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

328

NOV 10 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : H. A. Ladd

DATE: October 26, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Tolson ☒
Ladd ☒
Clegg ☒
Glavin ☒
Nichols ☒
Rosen ☒
Tracy ☒
Harbo ☒
Mohr ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Nease ☒
Gandy ☒

Purpose:

To inform you that biological warfare tests being conducted in the San Francisco, California, area by Army and Navy representatives were regarded as successful.

b6

Background:

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You will recall that information has been previously furnished to the Bureau by its liaison arrangements at Camp Detrick, Maryland, and the Naval Biological Laboratory, Oakland, California, that BW tests were being made in the San Francisco area by

b6

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b7D

Recent Developments:

b2

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RECORDED - 127

100-93216
OCT 31 1950

24


100-93216

EHM:bar

CHS
FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/14 BY 60321 uc/mj/sba/c2

278



b6
b7C
b7D

Action:

The above is for your information.

✓ *[Handwritten signature]*

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

422 Federal Office Building
Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California
October 19, 1950

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRMAIL REGISTERED

Director, FBI

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bufile 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

Remylet 9/25/50 and Bulet 9/26/50.

b2
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b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/CB
ON 11/13/04

CFB:LMR
65-4167


RECORDED - 121

OCT 24 1950

b6

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SF File 65-4167




b2

b7D

The Bureau's appreciation of [redacted] offer to provide indoctrination of Bureau Agents in regard to matters of BW was expressed in accordance with Bulet of 9/26/50. [redacted]



Very truly yours,


Harry M. Kimball
Special Agent in Charge

SEC, Baltimore

October 31, 1950

Director, FBI

CHEMICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

Biological Warfare

Arrangements have been made for SA [redacted] of the FBI Laboratory to visit Edgewood Arsenal on November 8, 9, and 10 in order to obtain technical information of interest to the Bureau in connection with the above-entitled matter.

b6

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White will arrive in Baltimore about 8 A. M. on November 8, 1950. Please arrange transportation from Baltimore to Edgewood Arsenal.

lm

BJWMEG

meq

RECORDED - 81

EX-89

100-93216-375
NOV 2 1950
49

RECEIVED
NOV 1 1950
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED READING ROOM
NOV 1 10 40 AM '50
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 10
NOV 1 1950
COMM - 21

52 NOV 6 1950
274

Vim

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/13/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI *even letter*
 FROM : SAC, New Haven *9-18-50*
 SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

DATE: September 28, 1950

[redacted] - Informant

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On September 15, 1950, [redacted]

[redacted] while being interviewed in connection with another matter, volunteered the information that [redacted]

b6

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/3/04 BY 60262 uc/jul/16/04

cc: Washington Field

98-1061

SFD:rs

RECORDED - 61

100-93216-376 D


b6

b7C

Director, FBI

September 28, 1950


b6
b7C
b7D



The Washington Field Office is requested to check the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Displaced Persons Commission for background information relating to [redacted] and furnish the same to the Bureau and the New Haven Office.

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It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to bring the above information to the attention of the armed services interested in bacteriological warfare. It is to be noted that [redacted] has stated that he would be willing to discuss further and assist in whatever way he could with information relating to [redacted]



SAC, NEW HAVEN

October 26, 1950

DIRECTOR, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

RECORDED - 61

EX - 14

Reurlet dated September 28, 1950, captioned "Bacteriological Warfare - Sabotage; [redacted] Informant."

The Bureau desires that prior to disseminating the information contained in your referenced letter to G-2 and ONI, the following discrepancies should be clarified by your office:

Your attention is directed to page 2, paragraph 1, of your referenced letter wherein the informant related [redacted]

[redacted] On page 3 of your letter, it is stated that the informant [redacted] In view of the above statements, it would appear that [redacted]

[redacted] This matter should be clarified.

Also on page 3 of your referenced letter, the informant reportedly stated [redacted]

[redacted] This statement is in conflict with the statement appearing on page 2 [redacted]

[redacted] It is desired that further clarification be obtained concerning the conflicting statements referred to above in order that the information contained in your referenced letter can be promptly brought to the attention of G-2 and ONI by the Bureau. This matter should be given immediate attention by your office.

For your information, a review of the Bureau's files has been made for information concerning [redacted]

[redacted] with negative results.

100-93216

EHM:bar

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

52 DEC 7 1950

OCT 26 1950

COMM - FBI

CI 52 3 OF 6N 2

NOV 8 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/84 BY 60267 UC/NLS/GJA/CP

FROM CHICAGO

10-10-50

NR 101515

11:32 A.M.

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

REQUEST BY CONGRESSMAN STEFAN FOR INQUIRY INTO HIGH DEATH RATE
OF HOGS IN STATE OF NEBRASKA AFTER INOCULATION. SABOTAGE.

REUR MEMORANDUM SEPTEMBER 20 LAST RE [REDACTED] MEMORANDUM
OCTOBER 5 LAST. REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED OCTOBER 10 UNDER TITLE
UNKNOWN SUBJECT - [REDACTED]

b6

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RECEIVED

10-10-50

11:45 A.M.

HL-GW

51 NOV 7 1950

RECORDED - 100-93216
INDEXED - Rat OCT 12 1950
cc: Mr. [unclear]

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Biological warfare

5R

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 19, 1950

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC

WASHINGTON FIELD

SUBJECT:

Biological Warfare - Espionage - Sabotage~~DISPATCHED TO NEW YORK~~~~SABOTAGE~~

INFORMANT

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Re New Haven letter to the Director dated September 28, 1950. ✓

By above referenced letter the New Haven office requested that the files of the Displaced Persons Commission and Immigration and Naturalization Service be checked for information concerning the above-indicated informant.

For the information of the New York and Boston offices, ~~when returning~~ did not receive copies of referenced letter, the New Haven office advised that

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It has been suggested by the New Haven Office that the Bureau may desire to bring [] information, which is of a technical nature, to the attention of the Armed Services interested in bacteriological warfare but have first requested background information concerning []

The files of the Displaced Persons Commission, 900 Independence Avenue, Washington, D.C., contained only a summary of information concerning the above informant, which reflected the following pertinent information:

b6

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DGH:JG

100-20142

cc: New Haven (98-1061)

New York

Boston

RECORDED - 65

INDEXED - 65

EX-71

100-23216

OCT 19 1950

b6

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/04 BY 60327 uc/mjs/BK/CS

Let to file v New Haven
9 Nov 10 20 50

WFO 100-20142

Displaced Persons Commission records presently indicated that

[REDACTED]

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The records of Immigration and Naturalization Service reflect that these two files were forwarded to the Boston Division office of Immigration and Naturalization Service on October 5, 1950, and July 28, 1950, respectively.

Displaced Persons Commission records further reflected that

[REDACTED]

The New York Office is requested to review [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The Boston Office is requested to review [REDACTED] Immigration and Naturalization Service file at the District Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service and the file of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It should be noted that the files of the Displaced Persons Commission had two variations of the spelling of the informant's name other than that set forth by the New Haven Office; these were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SAC, New Haven

October 30, 1950

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Washington Field Office letter dated 10-19-50.
captioned "Bacteriological Warfare - Sabotage, [redacted]
[redacted] - Informant," and re Bureau letter dated 10-26-50.

Bureau files fail to reflect any information that can
be identified with [redacted]

In referenced Bureau letter you were advised
Bureau files fail to reflect any information that could be
identified with [redacted] Bureau files do reflect,
however, the following references to [redacted] who is not
known by the Bureau to be identical to [redacted] referred to in
referenced Washington Field Office letter:

The Narodni Glasnik (The National Herald), a pro-Communist
newspaper published in Pittsburgh, in its October 3, 1944 issue
contained an article entitled "\$72 to the Fund of Narodni Glasnik."
The name of George Bilic, Sacramento, California appeared in this
article as a donor who had donated \$10 to the aid of this newspaper.

(100-10123-114, p. 680)

The Narodni Glasnik in its March 29, 1945 issue contained
an article entitled "Celebration in Sacramento Exceeded All
Expectations." The article reflected that a celebration had been
held in Sacramento, California in honor of the 37th anniversary
of the Narodni Glasnik. Contributions were made, according to
the article, by a list of persons to strengthen the newspaper.
The name of George Bilic appeared in the list of names of con-
tributors. (100-10123-114, p. 1210)

[redacted] of the New
York Office on December 13, 1949 furnished [redacted]

(61-7341-47-23)

The above has been furnished to your office for information.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

100-93216-378

EHM:EHW

OCT 30 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/04 BY 60262 uc/lus/bja/kb

b6

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b7D

b2


b6

b7C


b7D

278
58 NOV 16 1950

red from CIA through Liaison Channels
Date 11/6/50 *cg*



~~SECRET~~



TELLIGENCE A

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Handwritten signature

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b7C


NOV 6 1950

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
(11/6/50)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: ~~Soviet~~ Poisoned Bullets




1. This Agency has received the following information concerning the Soviet use during World War II of poisoned bullets. This information originates with




2. According to this source, Soviet agents in World War II used poisoned pistol bullets in their attempts on the lives of the German government functionaries in the occupied territories.

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This bullet is used to secure a mortal effect even when the hit has not been deadly.

3. It has been proven that such bullets were used against the high functionaries of the civilian German government with three sorts of effects.



b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/14/83 BY 60367 uc/nls/ajab
Pgs 1-2, 06A-12415/13 uc/nls/ajab

R-3
NOV 18 1950
228


RECORDED - 64
INDEXED - 64

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten signature

100-93216-379

NOV 7 1950




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~~SECRET~~

4. The above data are furnished you for your confidential information only and are to be given no further dissemination.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director



b2

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

August 22, 1950

Mr. D. M. Ladd

A. H. Belmont

BUREAU WAR PLANS

PURPOSE

To recommend that the Laboratory study the problem of biological warfare material being [REDACTED] and thereafter make recommendations regarding preventive measures which could also be applied [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

b7E

You will recall that considerable study has been given in the past, by the Army's BW research groups, to the introduction of BW materials [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ACTION

b7E

It is recommended that the Bureau Laboratory study the problem of biological warfare material being [REDACTED] and thereafter make recommendations regarding preventive measures which could also be applied [REDACTED]

LW:EFF

RECORDED - 2

100-23216-
NOV 14 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/3/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-23216-11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*~~SECRET~~

DATE: November 10, 1950

FROM : [REDACTED] *WPK*

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]

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Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

[REDACTED] of the FBI (S)
 laboratory, Lane of the Internal Security Section,
 and [REDACTED] of Liaison, interviewed the captioned
 individual at 10 a.m. on November 10, 1950. [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] desired to discuss with him the practical
 aspects of bacteriological warfare, particularly con-
 cerning the potentialities of sabotage in relation to
 this matter. [REDACTED] (S)

Upon introducing himself, [REDACTED]
 launched into a lengthy monologue regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indi-
 cated that his reason for contacting [REDACTED] the FBI (S)
 was strictly one of patriotism; [REDACTED]

RECORDED - 45
 INDEXED - 45

NOV 17 1950

12

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

12/15/03

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 2/15/03

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NR 11/12/50
12/18/50
WES

OBSERVATIONS:

as being [redacted] impressed the FBI representatives

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[redacted]
it is believed that the direct statements to [redacted]
not to use the name of the FBI in any capacity could not
be stressed too strongly. Liaison will follow with Army
in the event any developments occur in this matter.

100-93216-381,

~~SECRET~~

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

422 Federal Office Building
Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California
November 15, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

182 Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/ms/bx/cc
ON 1/13/04

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bufile 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

Remylets dated October 19, 1950, and September 25, 1950.

[redacted] has advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

AIRMAIL 2 WHEELS OF INDICE
CFB:EKK E. B. I.
65-4167 INTEROFF: SECURITY 2M

59 NOV 25 1950

RECEIVED
RECORDED - 33

100-93216-383

[redacted]

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Director, FBI

Re: Biological Warfare
Espionage - Sabotage

Since there does not, at this time, appear to be any necessity for such a conference between [] and a Bureau official, no such conference is being suggested.

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Very truly yours,

Harry M. Kimball
HARRY M. KIMBALL
SAC

100-93216-389
Date: November 1, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Chief, Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[REDACTED]
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed by Special Agents of the New Haven
Office on September 19, 1950. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

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Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

EHM: gmu: jpa

MAILED 6
NOV 3 - 1950
COMM - FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 1/13/24

52 DEC 7 1950

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-374410-1

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The files of this Bureau contain no information which
can be identified with [redacted]
[redacted] whose name appears
in the above data furnished by [redacted]

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The above has been furnished for your ~~confidential~~
information with the thought in mind that you may desire to
contact [redacted] for additional data concerning
biological warfare.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 28, 1950

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bureau File 100-93216)

REBULET to New Haven dated 10/26/50.

The following corrected pages of New Haven letter to the Bureau dated September 28, 1950, are being submitted in accordance with instructions set forth in the reference Bureau letter, i.e., Pages 2 and 3.

66
EX-36
SFD:FGM
98-1061
Enclosure

cc Washington Field (100-20142) (Encl.)

RECORDED - 66

EX - 36

100-93216-384

34

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/pjA/CAS

Director, FBI

November 14, 1950

SAC, Buffalo

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROTECTION OF ~~CLASSIFIED~~ INFORMATION
ESPIONAGE - R

AMSD

On November 10, 1950 [redacted]

[redacted] accompanied by
[redacted] Intelligence Officer for the Office of Naval Materiel, Buffalo
Division, Buffalo, New York, called at this office to furnish information con-
cerning the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. [redacted]
first reported this information to [redacted] and it was at [redacted] suggestion
that he came to the Buffalo Office.

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Encl (4 copies of 1 memo)

LFM:OKH
65-1910

56 JAN 16 1951

100-93216-
NOT RECORDED
73 DEC 19 1950

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mst/bja/co
ON 1/13/04

Letter to Director
RE: PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
ESPIONAGE - R

Buffalo, New York
November 13, 1950

[REDACTED]

b7D

In regard to [REDACTED] the Buffalo Office files contain a record of a complaint received on August 28, 1942 to the effect that

[REDACTED] were engaged in suspicious activities. An investigation conducted by the New York State Police at the request of this office revealed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in order to hold drinking parties there. They did this, according to the report, in preference to drinking in public or having parties in Silver Creek where they might be the subject of "small town criticism". At the time this investigation was conducted, [REDACTED] SCHMITT were the operators of the Silver Creek Precision Company and [REDACTED]

In addition, at that time, the Buffalo Police Department had a record of [REDACTED]

Enclosed is a memorandum of the information furnished by [REDACTED]

Since [REDACTED] has advised that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been advised of this information and that [REDACTED] is taking appropriate action through channels, no further action on the part of this office is contemplated WACB.

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MEMORANDUM

RE: [REDACTED]

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On November 10, 1950 the Buffalo Office of the F.B.I. re-
ceived information from Confidential Informant [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] whose reliability is not known, that [REDACTED] has disclosed in-
formation of a very confidential nature to persons not authorized to receive
it. [REDACTED]

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According to [REDACTED]

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In connection with the release of the above information by
[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

DATE: 11/14/50

FROM : SAC BOSTON

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
ROSPY LAW CHARCHENKO - INFORMANT

Re Washington Field Letter to the Director dated October 19, 1950.

The files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 73 Tremont St., Boston, Mass., contain the following information concerning [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]b6
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This file indicated the following residences for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BIA/KCB[REDACTED]b6
b7C

This file further indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]CAR:sc
100-21199
CC New Haven (98-1061)b6
b7C

55 NOV 27 1950

RECORDED
INDEXED
EX-11

NOV 28 1950

100-93216-385

CAR:ec
100-21199

No further information was available concerning

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
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CAR:ec
100-21199

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No further information was available.

RUC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO *for*

DATE: November 9, 1950

FROM : D. J. PARSONS *23*

b6

b7C

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SA T. D. BEACH
TO CAMP DETRICK, MARYLAND
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Recently SA [] spent five days at Camp Detrick, Maryland, the Army's bacteriological warfare installation. The purpose of this visit was to obtain information on the present activities and developments in this field as well as to give [] an adequate amount of information and training for any future instructional assignments related to the subject. The general consensus of opinion expressed by the technical personnel at Detrick is to the effect that bacteriological agents (agent being defined as the organism or products of the organism) can be used very successfully in offensive warfare and even more successfully in acts of covert sabotage. There appears to be much more concern on the part of the veterinarians because of the possibility of the successful use of animal disease agents being introduced, and on the part of some of the plant pathologist where cereal plants are concerned.

The veterinarians consider hoof and mouth disease, primarily a disease of cattle, and rinderpest, also a disease found in cattle and other domestic animals as well, to be extremely dangerous should they be introduced in this country. There has been no hoof and mouth disease for some years here in this country and the nearest foci are in Mexico. The last outbreak in the United States was stamped out by the slaughtering and burying of diseased animals.

There has been no outbreak of rinderpest on this continent. However, it is a highly infectious disease for many animals used as food. The introduction of either one of these could very well result in serious epidemics among domestic animals with serious consequences.

The plant pathologists are fearful of an introduction of strains of wheat rust to which our predominant species of wheat are not resistant. There are two strains which are considered particularly dangerous. One of them has never been encountered in this country and at present there are no known species of wheat which are not susceptible. As for the second one, most of the wheat grown in the wheat belt is resistant, but there are other species of wheat grown which offer no resistance to this rust. The latter species was discovered present last year in certain restricted areas in the middle west. However, it is believed that the introduction of this species was accidental and was carried into the middle west by the wind from the south and east.

With respect to human disease organisms, quite a large number

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TDB/mek

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NOV 22 1950

100-93216-386

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Memo to Mr. Harbo ^{b7C}

Re: Visit of SA [redacted] to Camp Detrick, Maryland

have been considered as offering potentialities with respect to bacteriological warfare and acts of sabotage, but due to difficulties in culturing, instability, their delicate nature, or complicated life cycle, they have been considered of less importance.

b7E

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: MANUAL INSERT Biological Warfare Sabotage

DATE: November 10, 1950

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Nease ☒

Gandy ☒

On November 10, 1950, the Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Ladd, McIntire for Clegg, McGuire for Nichols, Sizoo, Rosen, Mohr and Belmont, recommended that the attached insert be incorporated in Section 86 of the Bureau Manual dealing with sabotage. This insert furnishes the field with information to guide the field in the handling of information and complaints dealing with biological warfare.

The insert is based on an opinion furnished by the Department on a series of hypothetical instances involving biological warfare sabotage. Inasmuch as the Department stated that under certain circumstances a violation of the Sabotage Statute may exist, it is believed that the Department's answer should be incorporated in full in the Manual of Instructions.

The Executives Conference unanimously recommended the inclusion of this insert in the Sabotage Section of the Manual. In the event you approve, it will be incorporated.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

CC: Mr. H. H. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

Attachment

AHB:mer

RECORDED - 74
INDEXED - 74

100-93216-387
NOV 22 1950

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DATE 11/18/84 BY 60324 UC/LTS/BJS/1/00

Revision made
11/17/50
Comp/mt
59 DEC 9 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*

SUBJECT: MANUAL INSERT
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SABOTAGE

DATE: November 2, 1950

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

PURPOSE

To recommend the attached Manual insert concerning biological warfare be incorporated in Section 86 of the Manual concerning sabotage.

DETAILS

In view of the current publicity concerning biological warfare a series of hypothetical instances involving biological warfare sabotage was directed to the Department. On October 3, 1950, the Department furnished an opinion regarding this series of incidents. Inasmuch as the Department advises under certain circumstances a violation of sabotage statutes may exist, it is believed the Department's answer should be incorporated in full in the Manual of Instructions.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the attached Manual insert be presented to the Executive Conference for approval.

EFL:CMC

2 ENCL
59 DEC 9 1950
AHS

originals used in
Revision 11/17/50
CMP/mb

INDEXED - 74

NOV 22 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/13/94 BY 60267 uc/MS/BJA/CB

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

1. Identity of the company and its contractual relations, whether direct or indirect, with Army or Navy.
2. A detailed statement of the damage involved.
3. Statement concerning the existence of a labor dispute including:
 - a. Identity of union
 - b. Extent and duration of dispute
 - c. Names of representatives of the union, together with any known subversive tendencies
4. Evidence of any subversive influence involved.

This information should be immediately reported to the Bureau by teletype, followed by a closing report.

(8) Biological Warfare

The Criminal Division of the Department was presented with several hypothetical instances involving biological warfare sabotage activity to determine whether existing sabotage statutes cover civilian personnel not engaged in national defense employment.

On October 3, 1950, the Criminal Division advised as follows:

"The statutes applicable to your hypothetical cases are contained in 18 U.S.C. 2151, 2153, 2154, 2155 and 2156. Section 2151 contains definitions which you will note differentiate between times of war and of peace in defining 'war material', 'war premises' and 'war utilities' and in peacetime 'national defense material', 'national defense premises' and 'national defense utilities'. According to the statute, willful injury to those articles defined by the statute with certain intent as spelled out in the statute is necessary. In this connection you will note that if the end result is only to slow down production but not to injure the articles defined, no violation of the sabotage statute would result.

"With the foregoing statement in mind, the hypothetical cases which you have posed have been reviewed.

- "1. The poisoning of food in a factory manufacturing war materials under contract to the United States Government.

"Since the food is not being manufactured as a war material but is being used in a factory manufacturing war material, the poisoning of that food does not come within the purview of any of the provisions of the sabotage statute.

- "2. The poisoning of food being processed and canned, where the food is to be sold to the general public.

"Food and foodstuffs come within the definition of 'war material' when they are 'intended for, adapted to, or suitable for the use of the United States or any associated Nation, in connection with the conduct of war, and during times of peace when the food or foodstuffs are 'intended for the use of the United States' they are 'national defense material'. Whether the food which you describe as being poisoned comes within the statute will depend on the circumstances and each case would have to be judged on the facts.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/2/04 BY 60207 uel/nes/ky/ACB

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

EFL:CMC

Care

RECEIVED READING

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V. J. G. ABZ Jm

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

868

- "3. Releasing biological agents in a theater or similar public area attended by a mixed group of persons employed on National Defense work, employed by the United States Government, and those not employed on National Defense work or for the United States Government.

"Since the release of biological agents in the theater will not act on material, premises or utilities but rather on persons in the theater, such release will not come within the purview of the sabotage statutes.

- "4. The use of biological agents against crops and livestock where the food will be used by a mixed group consisting of civilians not engaged in National Defense employment, civilians in National Defense work and military personnel.

"The use of biological agents against crops and livestock will come within the statute when the food will be used by military personnel. During time of war it would thus be intended for, adapted to or suitable for the use of the United States and as such would be 'war material'. During time of peace where the food would be used by military personnel it would then be intended for the use of the United States in connection with the national defense and thus come within the statute.

- "5. Poisoning the water supply of a large metropolitan area at the source (the source not being on United States Government property), where the water is used by a mixed group consisting of civilians employed in National Defense facilities, by civilians not employed in National Defense facilities and by military personnel. Poisoning the water supply of a locality where the water is used only by civilians not employed in National Defense facilities.

"When the water supply of a large metropolitan area is poisoned at the source and military personnel use that water supply, then it comes within the definition of a 'war utility' in time of war and a 'national defense utility' in time of peace and thus would come within the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2153 and 2155. When the water supply is used only by civilians not employed in national defense facilities, the act of poisoning does not come within the purview of the sabotage statute.

"It should be noted, of course, that even when the act does not come within the purview of the sabotage statute, yet it will violate some local law such as murder, manslaughter, assault and battery, malicious mischief, etc."

06x

Section 20, Internal Security Act of 1950, Public Law 831
of 81st Congress requires the registration of any person
who has knowledge of or has received instructions or assign-
ment in espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, service or
tactics in the government of a foreign country or a foreign
political party. In view of this statute, therefore, an
investigation of any reported act of biological, chemical,
or radiological warfare sabotage should be instituted
immediately in order to identify the perpetrator and to
determine if there has been a violation of this statute
in addition to a violation of the sabotage statutes.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

301 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
November 15, 1950

Director, FBI

Re: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bufile 100-93216)**

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Sir:

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 1/13/04

Rebulet 10/3/50.

On 10/31/50, contact was made at the Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, by SA [redacted] Division Chief, Security and Intelligence Division, broached the subject of liaison mentioned in bulet and advised that he had been designated by the [redacted] to handle this liaison. He exhibited a letter dated 10/2/50, from [redacted] Chemical Officer, to the Commanding Officer of the Dugway Proving Ground requesting that he co-operate with the FBI in every way possible. This letter also enclosed a letter dated 9/28/50, from [redacted] Security and Training Division, on behalf of Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Sixth Army, advising that the FBI was interested in establishing direct liaison at the Dugway Proving Ground and stating that the FBI's interest is predicated on a desire to be in a position to be of maximum assistance to the Commanding Officer of the Dugway Proving Ground in the event of an emergency. It was stated that this could be best accomplished through a personal as well as an official working relationship between the personnel of both agencies and would insure the FBI's knowledge of the physical characteristics of the installation, their ready access thereto when called upon, and a knowledge of problems which may be encountered. It stated that the Chief Chemical Officer had been consulted on this matter and had given his concurrence.

[redacted] advised that the Dugway Proving Ground was re-activated 7/1/50, under the command of [redacted] administrative officer, and that Lieutenant Colonel SPEERS G. PONDER is the [redacted] and in charge of research. He advised that the Proving Ground was set up as a testing and proving ground for radiological, bacteriological, and chemical warfare equipment, and is an installation under the command of the Chief of the Chemical Corps, Sixth Army Area.

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65-1122

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Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50)
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] was interviewed in the presence of [redacted]
[redacted] and the scope of the liaison as set forth in bulet was discussed.
[redacted] indicated his desire to co-operate with the Bureau
and referred SA [redacted] to [redacted]

On November 1, 1950, [redacted]
[redacted] Dugway Proving Ground, was interviewed and furnished the following
information which he advised is considered ~~top secret~~ by the War Department:

He advised that the United States is wide-open and vulnerable to a
bacteriological warfare attack, based on the fact that persons can travel in
this country without restraint and the ease with which bacteriological warfare
substances can be disseminated. He advised that the three fields in which
bacteriological warfare research is being conducted are man, animals, and
agricultural products.

He advised that research in the field has come to an advanced stage
and that the Army has the knowledge to do a very effective job in the covert
field, that military use would be effective, but that the knowledge of the
engineering aspects of military use of bacteriological warfare has not
progressed to a point of practical use. He advised that the dissemination of
bacteriological warfare agents through missiles is not developed to a stage
for practical use. He advised that the great difficulty in combating bacte-
riological warfare engaged in by covert agents for sabotage purposes is that
on the outbreak of a disease it would be difficult to determine if it were a
natural outbreak or a planned infestation. He stated also that the medical
profession of this country is not educated to the possibilities of bacte-
riological warfare and that disease strains resistant to conventional treat-
ment have been created and that hence the medical profession would not be
likely to readily distinguish induced from natural occurrences of disease.
He suggested that the Bureau in order to combat sabotage may desire to
institute some form of liaison with the medical profession, under which liaison
cases of disease difficult to diagnose, unusual in location, or heavy in
occurrence would be reported for investigation.

[redacted] advised that in the field of bacteriologi-
cal warfare research no new germs have been developed but that research has
been aimed at developing strains of germs impervious to established methods
of treatment. He advised that germs have been developed, the parent strain
of which is killed by penicillin or other "miracle drugs," and that these
germs thrive on such drugs. This is done he stated by culturing surviving
organisms in progressively stronger concentrations of the drug.

In the field of germs effecting man, he advised that through
selective culture smallpox strains have been developed against which immuniza-
tion by vaccination is not effective.

Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50)

Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

He stated that research has not progressed to a point where epidemics could be created in populations and that bacteriological warfare agents used against man, for all practical purposes, would require individual infection. He stated that the possibility of causing epidemics in cattle is very good because of the lack of sanitary control of cattle. He advised that epidemic infestation of food crops is possible and could easily be carried out by traveling through belt areas where important crops are raised, such as the wheat belts in the Midwest, and releasing airborne spores of plant disease.

He stated that research has been made on undulant fever caused by brucella melitensis and that at least four strains have been developed, each with five to ten variations. Research has also been made on anthrax caused by bacillus anthracis. Both of the above diseases infect man and cattle. He stated that research has also been made on the bubonic plague (virulent pestis) and on psittacosis caused by the bacteria salmonella psittacosis, which infect man, and that the Chemical Warfare Corps is in a position to effectively use these four diseases by covert means and will have perfected methods of distributing them by bombs within a year.

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b7C [redacted] stated that research has been made on a hoof and mouth disease (rinder-pest), caused by a virus, and that a large stockyard area such as Chicago could be infected with the contents of a small vial by a saboteur. He advised that an induced epidemic of this disease of cattle in the United States would break the economy of the country.

He advised that other diseases on which research is being conducted are smallpox, typhus, and poliomyelitis.

He stated that research has been made on botulinus poison, a chemical compound produced by bacteria, and that it can be produced in quantity and is ready for war use. In use it can be distributed in food or more effectively in water supplies, in which it would be a deadly poison to man.

He stated that research is being made on mussel poison, a protein chemical compound created naturally by bacteria in shell fish. He stated that this compound, not yet named, has been isolated and that they are on the verge of synthesizing it. In use it would be disseminated by air as it effects the respiratory system of man.

He stated that research is being made in the field of ^{CARBAMATES} carbonates, specifically to synthesize curare with a view of its possible use in making poison bullets.

corrected 411 1/6/51-2

Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50)

Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Regarding the possible methods of distributing bacteriological warfare agents aimed at man by a saboteur, [redacted] advised that the most likely method would be through contamination of water supplies, in which case small amounts would be effective against a large number of people.

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Very truly yours,



JAY C. NEWMAN
Special Agent in Charge

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November 18, 1950.

Rec'd 11/21/50

[Redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

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Dear [Redacted]

Please accept my appreciation
for the intelligent and courteous audience granted
to me recently, during my visit to Washington.

I sincerely hope you will keep
me posted regarding when and if I can be of as-
sistance to you in your formidable tasks.

Respectfully,

b6

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0 BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

RECORDED - 94
INDEXED - 94

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EX-118

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

59 DEC 9 1950

DATE 1/3/04 BY 60327 uc/10/6/1/CS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo

DATE: November 16, 1950

FROM : OD. J. Parsons

SUBJECT: ~~Biological Warfare~~ ~~CHEMICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE~~

Visit of SA [] to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

On November 8, 9, and 10, 1950, SA [] visited Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, in order to obtain information concerning recent developments in chemical warfare. The purpose of this visit was to ascertain the possibilities of the use of chemical agents in sabotage and to learn the latest developments in the protection of personnel subjected to attack through sabotage or warfare using these agents.

*TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AVAILABLE

Although the Chemical Warfare Corps has developed and tested a large number of chemical agents at Edgewood Arsenal in the past few years, the agents which are considered to have the greatest potentialities as war gases and also for use in sabotage are the so-called nerve gases, which are designated as

G-agents. []

These materials upset the normal enzyme action in the blood and thereby directly affect the nervous system. This action takes place almost immediately after contact and extremely small amounts of the G-agents will incapacitate and produce death. The effect of these agents is prolonged and cumulative.

*TOXICITY OF G-AGENTS

G-agents are toxic if inhaled, taken orally through the mouth as in water or food, and they are also absorbed through the skin. By inhalation it is calculated that [] of air if breathed for one minute would kill an individual. Because of the cumulative effect [] would be fatal. Approximately the same amount, [] would hospitalize an individual for three days. [] would cause the pupils of the eyes to remain contracted to pin point size for more than 24 hours.

The G-agents are colorless liquids with practically no odor. []

This makes these agents particularly insidious, as all other poisonous gases previously used in chemical warfare had characteristic and penetrating odors. [] if present on the skin [] will produce death in less than an hour. []

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Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____

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DEC 8, 1950

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028
12/15/03 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
9581-3,064

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028
12/15/03 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
9581-3,064

~~SECRET~~

*AVAILABILITY OF *G-AGENTS TO RUSSIA

[redacted] *Tabun" was developed in Germany and large quantities of this material were prepared in Germany during World War II. [redacted] *Sarin" was also developed in Germany during World War II, but was not in production in large quantities. Quantities of both of these agents and information concerning their manufacture were taken by the Allies in 1945. At that time, Russia is supposed to have taken over and moved one of the plants which manufactured these agents into Russia. Some of the scientists who developed these compounds are also supposed to be in Russian territory. It is, therefore, known that Russia has these agents in probably large quantities because of their relative ease of manufacture and low cost production. [redacted] b2 b7E

*APPLICATION OF AGENTS TO SABOTAGE

Because of the fact that these agents are effective, either by inhalation or taken orally, they would be particularly adaptable for sabotage purposes. [redacted]

[redacted] to constitute a lethal concentration in a room approximately [redacted] This calculation is based on the assumption of only [redacted] exposure which would mean all individuals in the room would be killed by [redacted] exposure to this concentration. It is to be noted that approximately [redacted] of this amount probably would totally incapacitate an individual if breathed for [redacted] and it is doubtful if a person would be physically capable of getting out of the room. It is estimated that [redacted] in water would be toxic. This amount would produce poisonous symptoms. It is estimated that approximately [redacted] would be necessary to poison the water supply of a large city. [redacted] it is not believed likely the agent would be used in this way. [redacted] b7E

The agents could be placed in food and they would be lethal in about the same degree as in water. It is believed that the agents would be particularly effective if used for assassination purposes or for destroying a select group of people who might be concentrated in one room. [redacted]

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*RECOGNITION OF G-AGENTS

The most useful method for recognizing these agents is by the symptoms which they produce. This method is necessary due to the fact that the agents have no odor. The usual symptoms from exposure to the G-agents is a contraction of the pupils of the eyes, thereby causing blurring of vision. It is possible that a person would not notice this effect on himself and, for this reason, individuals who are working in buildings with possible contamination are cautioned to watch each other's eyes for this reaction. Because of this contraction, the eyes will ache, followed by a headache. There is usually noticed a tightness in the chest with difficult breathing and the nose runs similar to asthma attacks. These symptoms are followed by nausea and, if a lethal amount was obtained, a person will have convulsions before death. The initial symptoms are based on the assumption that an individual does not receive a lethal amount within the first few minutes of exposure.

The Chemical Corps is developing a chemical detection kit by which these agents could be identified in air or water. A request will be sent through liaison to obtain secret bulletins which have been published by the Chemical Corps concerning chemical identification of these agents.

*TREATMENT AND *PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS AGAINST G-AGENTS

It is, of course, essential that any treatment after exposure to the G-agents must be given within a minute or minutes. If follows, of course, that as soon as the symptoms are detected, gas masks must be put on. If no mask is available, then a wet cloth should be placed on the face and the individual should breathe through the cloth until it is possible to get out of the building or the affected area.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Any liquid which might get on a person's skin should be removed at once with a damp cloth, preferably dampened with water and baking soda. If the agents are suspected of being in water, it can be decontaminated by adding baking soda and boiling. The regular Army gas mask will give protection against the G-agents except in exceptionally high concentrations.

*GAS MASKS

At the present time gas masks which we have obtained are designated as type M-4. These masks will protect against ordinary concentrations of chemical warfare materials including G-agents and ordinary concentrations of bacterial warfare agents. According to the officials at Edgewood, the M-4 mask is now considered obsolete and if any further masks are obtained by the Bureau, it is suggested they should be of the type known as M-9. The M-9 mask is the one now recommended by the Army and has the canister which attaches on the side of the mask. This does away with the necessity of having an air tube such as used on the M-4. The M-9 is much more compact

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and would be much easier to operate, under conditions such as firing a gun, than the M-4. It is pointed out that insofar as the mask itself is concerned, the M-4 will give equal protection. The M-9 has the added advantage that it is designed to be used with hoods to prevent any leakage of the gas around the periphery of the mask. It is not believed that the hoods would be necessary for ordinary attacks using G-agents. The Army is contemplating using them only for decontamination purposes and for use if there is reason to believe there will be very high concentration of the G gases.

In connection with the use of hoods, other protective clothing such as rubber boots and butyl rubber gloves will be used in decontamination. At the present time, the Chemical Corps is developing a semi-permeable fabric clothing which would be much more desirable than the rubber.

It is probable that more information will be available on this in approximately six months. This phase of the work will be followed if the Bureau is desirous of obtaining such protective materials.

For the handling of G-agents in water, it was the opinion at Edgewood that any type of gloves impermeable to water and a gas mask would be sufficient protection.

~~SECRET~~ PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS

The engineers at Edgewood have worked out a system of protection for buildings against bacteriological warfare and chemical warfare. These protective systems are complicated and very expensive, including panel systems, filters, and air locks. For confidential information which should not be disseminated outside the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] This alarm system is designed for the protection against G-agents.

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~~SECRET~~
~~DESTRUCTION OF FILES~~

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~~SECRET~~
CONTAMINATES IN FUEL AND LUBRICATING OILS

This information is ~~secret~~ and should not be disseminated outside the Bureau as the Chemical Warfare Service desires that the presence of these materials be kept ~~secret~~ as far as possible. Various chemicals have been tested in order to find substances which are capable of

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OTHER POSSIBLE ~~CHEMICAL~~ AGENTS

For future reference, there are listed various other chemicals and drugs which are under examination at Edgewood Arsenal for possible use in chemical warfare. Most of these have previously come to the attention of the laboratory. One of these which is of interest is characterized as a psycho chemical agent.

|| [redacted] if dissolved in water will affect the mind in such a manner that a person will be incapable of making decisions or acting in an integrated manner. It does not have the action of a truth serum. [redacted]

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[redacted] are other extremely toxic substances which might be used in sabotage.

As of possible interest and for our confidential information, the

[redacted] will produce death.

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~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

~~SECRET~~

1. If the Bureau desires to secure any more gas masks, it is suggested that attempts be made to secure the M-9 type masks particularly for the use of special agents. It is believed that the M-9 mask would be superior to the M-4 because it is more compact, is designed for use with hoods, and because the M-9 would permit better manipulation of firearms. The M-4 masks do give equal protection to the M-9 and, therefore, if they are easier to secure than the M-9, it is suggested that they might be issued to clerical personnel.

2. Based on the information obtained at Edgewood, it is not believed necessary at the present time to secure protective hoods and clothing for possible handling of sabotage cases involving chemical poisons. It is recommended that any decision for such action be deferred for six months, at which time the development work on the semi-permeable clothing should be completed.

3. It is recommended that the "Protection of Buildings against Chemical Warfare" program at Edgewood be closely followed. These developments should also be completed within six months.

We will follow

4/8/52

file in
Biological Warfare

A Novel of Scientific Treason

Who Is My Neighbor?

By Nigel Balchin.

Little Brown. 308 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by John Franklin Bardin

Author of "The Burning Glass" and
frequent contributor to "The New Leader"

A GROUP of biochemists have been working for more than a decade on a method of mass immunization against epidemic which involves the development of super-virulents. On the eve of the publication of a paper which would make this scientific advance common knowledge, the alert government steps in and forbids publication on the grounds that the super-virulents are not without a military application which the enemy could use against the nation. Pressure is exerted to require the scientists to devote their technique to the ends of bacterial warfare. An agent of the enemy country almost succeeds in possessing himself of the secret by persuading one of the scientists that it is his responsibility to humanity to publish the paper surreptitiously.

Certainly the ethical conflict in the minds of democratic scientists, who believe that it is their role to increase knowledge regardless of the use to which it may be put by laymen or governments, when confronted with the evidence that their theories are being used against humanity, is a sound subject for a novel. Nigel Balchin has exhausted his theme in *Who Is My Neighbor?* and has written competently, melodramatically and

slickly. The scenes in the laboratory are as convincing as those in *Arrow-smith*; the dialogue and characterization has the terse authority of a craftsman who is not content to report but insists on rendering every facet of his form. No, there is no contradiction in what I have written. Mr. Balchin has rendered everything he intended to render, but he has written a slick melodrama.

The clue to what the novelist has left out in this case is the clue to what, no matter how unwitting, must be called the political bias of this book. Although the authorities of the democratic government win out in the end and the leading scientist, also the protagonist, wavers but does not commit the traitorous act—indeed, retrieving a fellow worker before he can betray his country—the reader finds himself at all times rooting for treason. The emotional identification lies with the kind of thick-headed irresponsibility that in our day too often is called "being aware of one's responsibility to mankind and to freedom."

If you are a novelist and know your trade, and you want to make your reader sympathize with qualities and ideas he would not otherwise ac-

cept as his own, you *dramatize* the side of the problem you are for and *report* the side you are against. You describe the protagonist in terms that make him the kind of person your reader innately wants to be, and you describe the authorities, whose law the hero will nearly transgress, as the sort of person the reader fears. In the end, you sell out the reader's sympathy by allowing your hero to "sell out" to ideals that have only been stated—and the reader closes his book emotionally agreeing with treachery.

This is the way the Communist point-of-view is being set forth in novels today. Mr. Balchin, who may be an honest dupe, can point to the fact that repeatedly in his novel he has his characters say and do those words and actions that are expected of free-thinking citizens in a democracy. And the critic can only point out that the novel is constructed to make the reader wish that the characters had not acted as they did. Incidentally and fortunately, the novel does not succeed in its purpose: it takes more than technique to make a reader believe—it takes the integrity of imagination and that is what Mr. Balchin lacks.

This is a clipping from
Page 22 of the
NEW LEADER

Date 11-27-50
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/04 BY 603267 uc NLS/gsk/b

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 5, 1950

FROM : [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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INFORMATION CONCERNING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/aj/100

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE

To advise results of a telephone call received from
[REDACTED] on December 4, 1950.

BACKGROUND

You will recall on November 10, 1950, captioned individual
was interviewed by Supervisors [REDACTED] At that
time [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A copy of this
memorandum is attached.

DETAILS

At 4:45 P.M. on December 4, 1950, [REDACTED] telephonically
contacted Supervisor [REDACTED] at which time he advised that [REDACTED]

EFL:CMC
Attached

32 DEC 28 1950

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RECORDED - 78

INDEXED - 78

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated he was furnishing the information to the Bureau for any action it desired to take and he was not contemplating following the matter any further.

ACTION

None - for your information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: 0 BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DATE: 12/7/50

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

On 12/5/50 SA [redacted] of the Baltimore Office contacted

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[redacted] and was furnished the following information:

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*This info document
by Branch of
Sect. 1. Annual
Conference
11-15-50
Edw*

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CLASSIFIED BY 60247 uc/us/aj/ab
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 12/15/03
83, 774, oct 12/15/03 60247 uc/us/aj/ab

EGG:DEP
66-891

Enclosure

RECORDED - 117
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59 DEC 15 1950

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L/Dir.
12/7/50
from SAC, Baltimore
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[Redacted]

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The book "Peace or Pestilence" is a source of considerable controversy among the employees at Camp Detrick, Maryland, and [Redacted] share the opinion that it should never have been written inasmuch as it exposes the experiments being conducted in biological warfare by the United States. It goes into considerable detail concerning them and also indicates the location of Camp Detrick and to some extent indicates the number and calibre of the personnel involved.

*92 ad
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*only 9 B.A.
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[Redacted]

*more details
re this in 2nd
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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L/Dir.
12/7/50
from SAC, Baltimore
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

stated that he will make each copy of the memorandum available for review by Agent []

Photographic copies of the three memoranda furnished by [] are being made, and the film will be forwarded to SA [] of the Laboratory in order that the prints made from it can be given appropriate confidential handling.

A copy of a memorandum prepared by [] entitled "Biological Warfare Sabotage Agents" is being forwarded by messenger to SA []




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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU
with letter from SAC Baltimore dated 12/7/50
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
Baltimore file 66-891

Two photos of wheat plants.

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DATE 11/23/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/pj/cb on Env.



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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CO

100-93216-3



Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Nichols _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
 ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DATE: 12/7/50

[redacted] Camp Detrick, Maryland, Bureau liaison with the
 Biological Warfare Unit of the Army Chemical Corps, advised SA [redacted]
 of the Baltimore Office on 12/5/50 that [redacted]

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EGG:DEP
 66-891

CC Dallas - PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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52 DEC 16 1950

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 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028

Ag 1, R3 AND E3, Ag 2, R2 AND E3, 06A 12/15/03 60267 uc/NLS/bja/CB

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 HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L/Director
from SAC, Baltimore
12/7/50
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b7D

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (C)

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This is being furnished to the Bureau and the Dallas Office as a matter of information to avoid any unnecessary investigation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (C)

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
The information concerning [REDACTED] should not be discussed with anyone by any member of the Dallas Office as one of the

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] information concerning it should not be disseminated to the Dallas Office personnel by the SAC.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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A careful investigation of available library sources has failed to show any information on 



Below is a list of the sources consulted.

Engineering Index: 1949 - 1940.

Industrial Arts Index: September 1950 - 1940.

U.S. Documents Monthly Catalogue: June 1950 - 1941.

International Index of Periodicals: September 1950 - April 1940.

Handbook of Civilian Protection by L. L. Snyder and others; McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., New York. 1942.

What the Citizen Should Know about Civilian Defense by W. D. Binger and H. H. Raithey; W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York. 1942.

Civil Defence by C. W. Glover; Chemical Publishing Co., Brooklyn, New York. 1941.

Radioactivity Protection Devices by F. R. Ingram; American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 42, June 1950, pages 537-543.

Atomic Wastes and Water Quality by W. A. Rodger; American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 42, June 1950, pages 533-536.

"... Taking into account the various factors enumerated, permissible levels

ENCLOSURE 100-95214-316

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have been tentatively determined for a number of specific radioactive isotopes. A table of such data has recently been published in the Journal (February 1950). To give some idea of the great degree of variation possible, it may be noted that the permissible concentration, in microcuries per liter, is 0.0000001 for radium and 6,000 for radiocarbon (C 14), a variation of 10^{10}

"Effects of Atomic Bombing. . . . The radioactivity released would be mixed at the instant of the blast with a tremendous quantity of water. . . . The water delivered after the first day to those consumers who survived the blast would have an activity level only ten times as high as the lifetime drinking tolerance. It is possible, of course, that 'slugs' of activity well above the levels estimated might come through the plant and into the mains unmixed. Such slugs could be detected by ionization chambers set at a relatively high level . . . Although it is possible that for 24 hours it would be well not to drink the water, it should be all right for all other purposes . . . In fact, under emergency conditions, the consumption of water with perhaps 1,000 times the normal activity would be permissible"

Research on the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes by C. R. Placak and R. J. Morton;
American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 42, February 1950,
pages 135-142.

". . . Permissible Concentrations . . . The tolerance value for beta and gamma emitters applies to mixed fission products. For each individual isotope, a different value might apply. Some theoretical values are shown in Table 3. The exact limits of tolerance cannot be given with absolute certainty until more biological and physiological data are obtainable. A reassuring statement should be made, however. If the tolerance values in use are in error, they are probably on the conservative side. It is thought that, for many of these materials, more than 100 times the amounts listed might be ingested, provided it were a single occurrence with no subsequent exposure

Table 3 (in part). Permissible Concentration of Radioisotopes

Isotope	Permissible Concentration in Tissue. $\mu\text{c./g.}$	Maximum Oral Absorption (fraction)
Ra	2.8×10^{-6}	0.35
C 14	1.5×10^{-2}	0.30
Sr 89	1.5×10^{-3}	0.05 - 0.60
Sr 90, Y 90	7.2×10^{-4}	0.05 - 0.60

Isotope	Maximum in Critical Organ		Half-Life, Effective (days)
	Organ	Fraction	
Ra	Bone	0.99	16,000
C 14	Total body	1.0	0.174
Sr 89	Bone	0.70	41.9
Sr 90, Y 90	Bone	0.70	196

b6

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Table 3 (continued)

Isotope Permissible Concentration - μ c./cc.
Water

Ra	1.1×10^{-10}
C 14	6.3
Sr 89	7.4×10^{-4}
Sr 90, Y 90	7.8×10^{-5}

" . . . Table is adopted from table prepared by K. Z. Morgan, Health Physics Division, ORNL; to be published by the National Research Council in the Handbook of Nuclear Instruments and Techniques"

Radioactivity; a new factor in Water Works Practice by A. E. Gorman; American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 41, December 1949, pages 1053 - 1060.

Safety Criteria in Radioactive Water Monitoring by H. A. C. McKay and G. N. Walton; Nucleonics, Vol. 5, August 1949, pages 12-21.

Contamination of Water Supplies by Radioactive Substances by J. C. Morris and J. R. Carritt; New England Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 62, March 1948, pages 1 - 9. Also, Civil Engineering (London), Vol. 43, June 1948, pages 293-295.

**EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO COMMANDER F. R. PHILBROOK
(MC, USN, Deputy Director, Preventive Medicine Division
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy),
MADE IN A SPEECH AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ON OCTOBER 31, 1950:**

"..... The second method involves the clandestine introductions of these agents to sabotage air, food, or water supplies. The saboteur who sets out to contaminate a water supply would not waste his material by disseminating it at the source of a protected supply, because filtration and the other usual sanitation procedures would defeat his purpose. He would even more profitably attack the distribution system near the point of use, selectively.

..... Two or more agents might be used simultaneously, thus complicating the problems for clinical and laboratory diagnosis and therapy.

..... As to when or where the enemy might use these contaminants, the answer of course is whenever and wherever it suits his purpose to do so. The possibility of sabotage directed against key individuals or selected population groups in advance of a declaration of war, must be borne in mind. Their use prior to an open declaration of war could be timed to an anticipated development period in such a manner that key individuals might be casualties at the time of need for important action on their part. Attacks against military targets might involve civilian casualties in this as in other forms of warfare....."

(NOTE FOR FILE: In this discussion, Commander Philbrook had in mind primarily B.W., for rather obvious reasons. We believe there is very little doubt but that anyone would place the problem of R.W. at a much higher order of probability.)


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100-93216-396
ENCLOSURE

December 8, 1950

RECORDED - 24

100-92201-276



EX-73

Dear [redacted]

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I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 1, 1950, forwarding copies of reports and correspondence concerning [redacted]

[redacted] This material has been placed in the hands of the FBI Laboratory staff for their information.

I wish to express my appreciation for the thoughts which prompted you to forward this data.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

TDB:MEG

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DEC 12 2 07 PM '50
DEC 12 2 07 PM '50
DEC 12 2 07 PM '50

RECEIVED

MAILED 16

DEC 9 - 1950

COMM - FBI

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F.B.I.

DEC 8 11 30 AM '50

REC'D - 1078012 OFFICE

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DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 MC/NLS/BJA/CB

DEC 9 3 13 PM '50
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FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

61 DEC 18 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RT*

DATE: December 7, 1950

FROM : D. J. Parsons *DJ*

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL FROM [REDACTED]

b6

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Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

[REDACTED] called on the telephone about 12:10 P.M. December 7, 1950, advising that [REDACTED]

You will recall that [REDACTED] visited the Bureau recently, at which time he conferred with Agents [REDACTED] At that time it appeared that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was suggested to [REDACTED] that he should call SAC George McSwain in Chicago and that he would furnish us with the information concerning time, date and place.

A letter is being forwarded to the SAC, Chicago concerning [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the letter to SAC, McSwain giving the background of [REDACTED] instructions to designate an agent from his office [REDACTED] report on it to the Bureau.

TDB:MEG

I don't think agent should attend. Attached letter changed.

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 DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bj/kb

RECORDED - 78
 INDEXED - 78

100-93216-399
 DEC 12 1950

SEVEN

SAC, Chicago

December 8, 1950

Director, FBI

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RECORDED - 78

100-93216-399
The above named person called at the Bureau recently and advised that

It is expected that [redacted] will contact your office by telephone in order to acquaint your office concerning the [redacted] as well as to urge your office to delegate a representative to witness [redacted] or to have your office advise the Bureau of this information.

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It is not desired that an agent from your office be designated to attend [redacted] and no one from the Bureau will be present. However, you should invite [redacted] to furnish the Bureau any results, data, or comments following [redacted]

TDB:MEG

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 8
DEC 9 - 1950
COMM - FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/3/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

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FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
REC'D-10720M.2 OFFICE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 21, 1950

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE
[REDACTED] - INFORMANT

b6

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Reference Washington Field letter to Bureau, 10/19/50.

A review of United States Displaced Persons Commission, European Case number 105526, at Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 Columbus Avenue, New York City, reflected the following information:

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b7D

cc New Haven (98-1061)

RLS:ED
100-91131ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

b6

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100-193216-400
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16
5-21-50

NY 100-91131
Letter to the Director

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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

The D.P.C. file further reflected investigation conducted by
Hq. Counter Intelligence Corps, Reg XI, 7970th CIC Group, European Command,
APO 800, U.S. Army, on [redacted] as follows:

1. Agency Checks

- a. Police and Court Records
- b. I.R.O. or Assembly Center
Records
- c. Denazification Records
- d. Post Provost Marshall
- e. Central Registry
- f. Berlin Document Center
- g. CIC files
- h. Others

Results

No record
No record
Not checked
Negative

Negative

NY 100-91131
Letter to the Director

Neighborhood Check

Name	Birth date	Address	Results
<div></div>			Negative
			b6
			Negative b7C
WALERIAN LANG	1/21/95	Northern DPC Wurzburg, has known 2 years (no relation)	Negative

No other information was available in the D.P.C. file. RUC.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 12/6/50

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE b6
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE b7CDECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/nls/bja/cb
ON 1/13/04

ATTENTION: SA [] - FBI Laboratory

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a memorandum entitled ~~Biological Warfare Sabotage Agents~~ prepared by [][] advised SA [] that he is preparing a supplement to this memorandum and will furnish the Bureau with a copy in the near future. The supplement is []
[] that could be used in B.W. []

b6

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Agent [] will report the results of his contact with [] on 12/5/50 by separate let.

EGG:arf
66-891ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE
Encl. *in the lab.*

RECORDED - 112

INDEXED - 112

100-23216-401
DEC 14 1950

b6

b7C

278
56 DEC 27 1950

Received thru Liaison
by [redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1/3/04 BY 60267UC/PCS/BJA/CB
#977600

100-95216-101

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : *Jan* SAC, Mobile

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE
SABOTAGE
Bufile 100-93216

DATE: 12/7/50

ReBulet 10/17/50 to this office under the above caption which refers to Mobile letter to the Bureau dated 9/28/50 under the caption "PROCLI, ESPIONAGE - C." There is being enclosed herewith for the Bureau five copies of the report of SA [redacted] dated 12/7/50 at Mobile in this matter, setting forth the results of a preliminary investigation at [redacted]

b6

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The Bureau is requested to advise if authority is granted for an interview with [redacted]

It should be noted, however, that [redacted]

It appears that no further logical investigation remains to be conducted in this matter at Tallahassee, Florida, accordingly, no further investigation is being conducted by this office at this time until such time as further instructions are received from the Bureau.

JBH-10

Encl. (5)

65-10

cc MIAMI

RECORDED - 89

INDEXED - 89

DEC 9 1950

34

b6

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

5-
89
20 20 10 to mobile
clm 12-20-53

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT MOBILE, ALABAMA

FILE NO. 65-10 JBH-10

REPORT MADE AT Mobile	DATE WHEN MADE 12/7/50	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 9/26, 10/31, 11/6-8, 24/50	REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]	b6 b7C
TITLE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (PROCLI)			CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Preliminary investigation reflects

with no apparent
subversive tendencies. Records of [REDACTED]no disloyal motives found. Credit
and criminal records negative.

- P -

DETAILS: AT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA.

[REDACTED] is presently a
student at Florida State University, advised reporting Agent on September 26,
1950 that [REDACTED]APPROVED AND
FORWARDED: [Signature]SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE

ENCLOSURE DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

COPIES OF THIS REPORT

- ⑤ - Bureau (100-93216)
2 - Miami
3 - Mobile

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/kb
ON 11/3/04

100-93216-402 RECORDED - 35

DEC 9 1950

INDEXED - 35

PROPERTY OF FBI.—This confidential report and its contents are loaned to you by the FBI and are not
to be distributed outside of agency to which loaned.

MO 65-10

b6

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b7D

It should be noted that the Bureau has formerly advised this office that the U. S. Army is [REDACTED]

The Bureau was advised of the foregoing information by letter dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office was instructed to discreetly obtain the name of [REDACTED] who reportedly discussed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information, established contacts and confidential informants [REDACTED] were that all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any possible repercussion or embarrassment to the Bureau.

On October 31, 1950 the original informant, [REDACTED] was re-interviewed. [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D

MO 65-10

b6 An examination was made of the records of the Credit Bureau of
b7C Tallahassee, the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and the Tallahassee Police
Department in efforts to determine if [] possessed possible records
at any of those sources, however, this phase of the investigation resulted
negatively.

- P E N D I N G -

MO 65-10

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

By separate letter the Bureau is being requested to grant
authority for an interview with [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D

MO 65-10

LEADS

MIAMI DIVISION

AT SARASOTA, FLORIDA:

b6

b7C

1. Will conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of

[REDACTED]

MOBILE DIVISION

AT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA:

b6

b7C

b7D

1. Will, in the event the Bureau authorizes such an interview, contact [REDACTED] and obtain complete information from him regarding [REDACTED]

2. Will conduct any further appropriate investigation suggested by coverage of the above leads.

REFERENCE: Mobile letter to Bureau 9/28/50.

Bureau letter to Mobile 10/17/50.

December 20, 1950

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
Mobile File 65-10

RECORDED - 89

Recep sa [redacted] dated 12-7-50 at Mobile,
reurlat 12-7-50 and reurlat 10-17-50.

There is set forth below for your information a review of the Bureau's files regarding the name [redacted]

By letter dated 11-18-47, captioned "Communist Party, USA, District #2, New York Office, Internal Security - C," (New York file 100-26603-C-40), the New York Office advised a quantity of unmailed circulars in addressed envelopes, had been made available by Confidential Informant [] on 11-1-47. The envelopes contained either a pamphlet by the Eugene Dennis Defense Committee or a circular relating to the outlawing of the Communist Party. One of these envelopes was addressed to []
[]
[] No other descriptive data was given. (100-3-4-6080)

The report of SA [redacted] dated 8-10-50 at New York, captioned [redacted]

The investigation of [] reflected Communist activity on the part of his mother-in-law and reflected he resided in a Communist apartment development. (121-23525-7)

For your information, Bureau files fail to reflect any derogatory information concerning [REDACTED]. Pursuant to your request, authorization is granted for your office to interview [REDACTED] concerning the subject, keeping in mind the instructions contained in referenced Bureau letter.

In connection with the information set forth above concerning a [redacted] when background data is obtained concerning her by the Miami Office, the Bureau desires that complete facts in this case be furnished by your office to the New York Office to determine whether the subject is identical to [redacted] referred to in the references in the Bureau's files.

For your information, copies of your referenced report have been furnished to the Armed Forces intelligence agencies.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

52 DEC 28 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1/13/01 BY 60327 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RH*
 FROM : D. J. Parsons *ES*
 SUBJECT: ~~RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE~~

DATE: November 16, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/3/04 BY 60267UC/NES/BJK/B

INDEXED - 22

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

On October 27, 1950, SA [] visited []
 [] U. S. Army, presently assigned to the Military Application
 Branch of the Atomic Energy Commission. The purpose of this visit was to
 discuss matters relating to radiological defense.

b7E

[] advised that he would like to have Agent [] talk
 with [] U. S. Navy, on matters relating to
 [] explained that [] has
 been working closely with [] and could
 more fully discuss problems relating to []

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JFG:MEG

RECORDED - 22

DEC 12 1950

INDEXED - 22 (ext 2 page)

EX-73

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DEC 29 1950

Technological Warfare

** Lecture for National Inst. of Defense - April 1946*

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
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JAN 5 1951

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011

Records Section
Please file

100-73216

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
 ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
 (Bufile 100-93216)

DATE: Dec. 21, 1950

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Remy let November 15, 1950.

As noted in relet, [redacted]

[redacted] Accordingly, it has not been possible to contact this informant and obtain any information of value concerning the captioned matter.

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[redacted] will be contacted in the near future when he returns from this trip, and the Bureau will be advised of any information thereby obtained.

CFB/umn
 65-4 167

RECORDED - 94

EX-35

100-93216-465
DEC 27 1950

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 ON 1/13/04



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

301 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
December 18, 1950

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Harbo _____



DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/bg
ON 1/13/04


~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bureau File 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

Set forth in this letter is information from ~~top secret~~ documents of the Army Chemical Corps and it is believed the fact they have been furnished and their source should be kept strictly ~~confidential~~.



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b6
b7C
b7D

RTH:MEN
65-1122
AMSD
REGISTERED-RRR

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INDEXED - 22
EX-100


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DEC 21 1950

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b7C


1951
278

TO: DIRECTOR
RE: BW



b6
b7C
b7D

The following is a summary of information relating to BW from these documents:



b7D

TO: DIRECTOR
BW

b6
b7C
b7D

The documents were not in possession of this office long enough to forward them to the Bureau for photostating purposes, nor was it considered advisable to do so in view of the confidential nature of them.

In the event the Bureau is unable to secure such documents as they are published in the future and if they are received at this division they will be photographed as has been done in this instance, unless advised to the contrary.

b6
b7C

Very truly yours,

JAY C. NEWMAN
SAC

9-2 annexed. That
copies of all pertinent material will be yes
made available to Bureau
JCN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo

DATE: December 20, 1950

FROM : D. J. Parsons

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ DEVICE DEVELOPED

b6

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b7D

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum from F. C. Holloman to Mr. Nichols dated December 5, 1950.

On December 19, 1950, SA [] discussed with [] of the Chemical Warfare Service the device developed by [] This device is an ozone generator []

BJW:MEG

RECORDED - 22

100-93216-407
DEC 28 1950

INDEXED - 22

3

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52 JAN 4 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NICHOLS *✓ m*
 FROM : F. C. HOLLOMAN *m*
 SUBJECT:

DATE: December 5, 1950

ol

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ladd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Glavin	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/>
Harbo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

H. C. Hoff

advised me in the strictest ~~confidence~~
 today that he had certain information regarding

b6
b7C
b7D

EX-100
ENCLOSURE

FCH:mb

RECORDED - 48

ENCLOSURE

DEC 28 1950

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RECEIVED

100-93216-40
 5-84m

Practical and Theoretical Aspects

Current water problems, dramatically brought to the fore by the shortages in New York, Jersey City and elsewhere, led Donald and Harry Fleck, water engineers, formerly of Jersey City, to analyze water shortages as follows:

Some years ago, we wrote to you concerning the water supply of Jersey City. What has come to pass permits us to indulge in a quip. "We told you so."

From an engineering experience covering a period of 26 years, first as young college graduates, when we were associated with our father

Dr. Henry T. Fleck, one of the seven trustees of the New York City Aqueduct Commission, and since then as engineers with the Hydrozone Corp. of America, we have gained a rather broad and comprehensive knowledge, both scientific and practical, of the water resources of the world. To say nothing of the uses and treatments of the said waters for industrial and/or drinking purposes.

Many years ago at one of the meetings of the above mentioned committee, Dr. Fleck brought out some graphs showing that in 1950 the population of the metropolitan area would be 16 million people and that outside of that metropolitan area the towns would increase proportionately. He stated: "In 1950 the City of New York will require a minimum of one billion gallons of water per day and in 1960 it will require a billion and a quarter gallons of water per day." It is important that we should now make provisions for this most vital problem facing the future of our city. If we do not, the day will come when New York City will have to ration water.

In conjunction with that idea, there is another problem which is even more important, and that is the study of the water resources available to the city. It is not sufficient to say there is plenty of water up in the Catskills or the upper reaches of the Delaware River. As we to say nothing of Philadelphia, tap those various sources, we will be placing a tremendous drain upon those available resources and, gentlemen, there is just so much water (fresh water) and no more. We get our water resources through precipitation. There is only a certain amount of precipitation. It varies from year to year, but over a decade it about realizes itself. The great majority of precipitation runs to the sea, while some of it replenishes the water table. But let us have a two-year drought which we could have in the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area would be in

Since then the statements of Dr. Block, as to the water resources have become actual facts and New York, New Jersey, as well as the entire country, are faced with a water problem so grave it far outweighs the present political football, "the atomic bomb."

For years we have been trying to get the various commissions, water departments and water officials, both public and private, to stop and think. Speak about water resources to any of them and the reply you get is, "There is plenty of water and besides that, it is the government's business." Governmental officials look wise, smile and say, "There is plenty of water, and besides the president has appointed a water resources commission."

If you think the average person or politician lacks interest in this vital problem, let us take a look at what is being written in the Water Works Magazine, and the editorial comment thereon. In the Nov. 24, 1949, issue of the Engineering News-Record one Farley Gannett has written an article labeled, "Let's Sell Water." The whole gist of the article is advice to the water work operators to get out and sell water, just like electrical companies sell electrical appliances, and like the telephone companies carrying on campaigns to influence the greater use of phones. Says Gannett, "Little has been done to develop new uses for water. Scoldon does one ever hear of a water company or a water department helping to develop new uses for water. The water works operators ought to be out pushing the sales of air conditioning machines and not worrying for fear water using air conditioning apparatus will be installed in the town. Let the air conditioners consume all the water they want. The more the better, the greater the profit."

As to the lack of water "It can be done, water can be found, and consumers will be satisfied to pay for it sums which would make the average water works operators gasp."

As an example of the quality to find fresh water supplies, Garrett states, "In a Caribbean city the inhabitants were drinking highly saline water because the fresh water wells had been pumped so hard that sea water was sucked into the fresh water wells. There wasn't any fresh water—or so the city water department thought. But a U.S. consulting-engineer-firm and London bankers are now planning a plant to provide ample, fresh water, but of course the cost will be more than \$1 per thousand gallons of water."

Our figures show that the actual cost will be at least \$155 a thousand gallons of water. Apply this to the needs of a city like New York, and such a plan would cost the people of New York City \$365 million a year in operating cost alone. And every time an additional 100 million gallons of water were needed it would cost the taxpayers another \$36 million more. Simple as that! But remember, these figures are for operating cost alone. The construction cost of the size of the plant required to distill a billion gallons of sea water would be colossal and the cost of paying off the bonds issued to build the said plant would have to be piled on top of that neat sum of \$365 million for operating cost. Then too there would be the interest on the bonds which would be a mere \$30 million added, a million added.

Mr. Cannett winds up his article with the following: "When water works men minimize their methods of doing business to correspond with its importance, when they get out and try to sell water, when they enter into the spirit of the growing community in which they do business, perhaps then we may see many changes in plants and physical methods of obtaining and supplying water and selling water."

Here is what the editor of the Engineering News-Record has to say about these brilliant ideas for Mr. Gannett. The logic of Mr. Gannett's argument cannot be denied: the water works industry can meet its ever-growing increasing and urgent problems if it acts to break its legal bindings and boldly follows business-like, aggressive managerial policies—and if it goes all out to sell water from any region or community . . .

Again in an editorial in the Engineering News-Record of December, 1949, we find the following under the heading "Water Works Men Agree": "The challenge—to pursue more aggressive business methods in developing supplies and promoting sales of water has been greeted with more than expected approval. Taken as a whole, the reaction promises well for the future—they indicate that water works managers are not only thinking about better business objectives; they are, in many cases, putting the principles into effect. Actually the situation presents an opportunity for water works men to do some real merchandising of water. There can be no doubt that a carefully planned, effectively executed campaign of water loss and water costs education could bring about the acceptability of metering, and thus contribute substantially to reducing water shortages in many places."

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STOPGAP SAVINGS NOT SENSIBLE APPROACH

Water Must Be Recaptured And Returned to Nature

Following is the second and final article by Donald and Harry Fleck, water engineers of long experience, giving their viewpoints on current water problems. First article appeared in yesterday's Jersey Journal.

Do you see any statement about the actual cause of the water shortage? All that is stressed is sales and more sales of water, or save water so more water can be sold. These are all stop gap, Pollyanna ideas. And yet this comes from one of the leading engineering news magazines in America. Bored down to cold facts, the whole idea is "get more water and sell it! Don't worry about anything else; the main idea is to promote more uses of water, so more water can be sold. Why worry about how much water there is. Somehow nature will provide that."

But where is all the water going to come from? The very concrete illustration that Mr. Gannett gives of the Caribbean city which said its fresh water wells by too much pumping can be duplicated very vividly by a look at the wells on Long Island. Here is concrete proof that the supply of fresh water is definitely limited.

THAT "800 MILLION"

In connection with the idea that there is plenty of water in the ground, an article appeared in Wednesday's Tribune which reported that some professor of the Ohio State University stated "that New York City had an untapped underground reservoir of 800 million gallons of water a day on Long Island." Evidently the water tables of the United States Government are sadly at fault, for they show no such thing, and from actual fact, every time a new well of good size is drilled, the water table drops and the flow of the other wells in the vicinity of the new well drops. What do you think would happen if pumps large enough to pump 800 million gallons of water per day were run steadily for a short while? Mr. Ocean would move in just as it did in the Caribbean city we mentioned above.

In conjunction with pumping of wells, five years ago we tried to tell the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard officials that due to the strata of the land in that section where the Navy Yard is located, if they continued to sink more wells all the water in those wells would become more and more filled with iron. This is a matter of record; some of those wells now have an iron content of over 40 p.p.m. (parts per million). The municipal allowance for iron content for drinking water is 3 p.p.m. Here again we see what can happen when a continual drain is put upon our water resources.

SEE PLAN INEFFECTIVE

It has been proposed that the City of New York go up the Hudson to Beacon and pump 100 million to 200 million gallons per day of Hudson River water into the city water system. Without going into the technical details of the 35-mile power line and the other equipment required as well as the time element for planning, manufacturing, delivering and erecting such a plant—(it will take at least 10 months to do this)—the simple fact is under the present rules and regulations of the U. S. Public Health Service which requires a minimum of .3 p.p.m. of chlorine residual in all drinking water, to attempt to disinfect and mix 100 million gallons of Hudson River water with less than a billion gallons of Croton or Catskill water would not produce a drinkable water. The minimum amount of Hudson River water when treated with the required amount of chlorine to produce a residual of .3 p.p.m. you could mix with Catskill or Croton water would be as 1 to 15, and even then New Yorkers would yell to high heaven at the odor and taste of the mixed water. This is nothing more than another drain upon our water resources, and there are other factors of great importance that do not appear upon the surface to

those not familiar with water problems.

Nor does the agreement between New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York as to the control of the upper Delaware Water Shed by building dams and impounding reserves for dry spells, solve the problem. It may make available sufficient water for those immediate needs calculated for the next five years. But how wrong calculations can be is vividly demonstrated by the present predicament in which we find ourselves.

Let us again face facts. New York City engineers say that the present shortage is due to the fact that the war interrupted the completion of the Delaware Reservoir plan. That is true. But suppose we are suddenly plunged into another war. It could happen! What about the increased water that would be immediately needed just as the last war interrupted the work on the above mentioned plans, so would the new war interrupt the plans again and even this is not solving the problem.

COMMON SENSE

In all this water problem it isn't a matter of who's right, it is a matter of common sense. You can't spend or use up more than you have. And where nature is concerned, it is a stern taskmaster. It plays no favorites.

Nature has a peculiar way of demanding you put back what you have taken away or else it stops giving out. If that is not so why are farmers forced to fertilize the ground? Why do farmers rotate crops? Why does the government demand a tree be planted for every tree cut down from the forest? Isn't that giving back to nature what it demands? Isn't that replenishing our resources instead of using them up?

All these searches for more virgin supplies of water and impounding those supplies by dams, pumping Long Island wells dry, all these stop gap savings-like-water holidays, metering, using salt water for flushing purposes and all the brilliant ideas such as taking 100 million to 200 million gallons of water from this or that river, stream or lake, or distilling sea water at \$1.50 per 1,000 gallons do not present any sensible approach to solving this great and important question about our water resources.

Of course, it is necessary to save water. Anything so precious must be conserved. Water is the world's greatest necessity. W. A. R. spells w-r. That stands for in order of importance water, ammunition, food, etc. If water is of foremost importance to the conduct of war, then how much more so must it be to the existence of the people?

MUST RECAPTURE WATER

Therefore, it is not sufficient to conserve water or save water. Water must be recaptured after its use and given back to nature so that nature can make it again available for use. Eighty-five per cent of all water used by municipalities and industries can be captured, treated and delivered back to where it originated — the land, so that nature can make it psychologically and actually fit to drink.

Fantastic? Impossible? Not in the least! For not more money than it cost to build the present water works system of any city great or small, this plan can be put into effect.

We are not talking about taking sewage, disposed effluent and spreading it over the countryside. The water that would be delivered to the watersheds would be absolutely pure water; a water as crystal clear and as sparkling pure as mountain spring water.

This is not the harebrained idea of some crackpot theoretical student or professor. It is an engineering activity, carefully studied and planned by engineers who have lived with water problems for years.

METHOD FOUND

The engineering details of recapturing the waste water presented no unsurmountable difficulties. It would be costly, but the result

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would more than justify the cost. The basic problem was to find a medium of purification and a method of perfect application of that medium of purification that would turn sewage disposal effluent water into absolutely pure drinking water and a water free from odor and taste. Furthermore, an application of the purification medium which would make it possible to treat either thousands of gallons a day or hundreds of millions of gallons per day at a reasonable cost. That method has been found. It has taken a long period of constant work done many years ago by Louis Pasteur, the great French scientist, and carried to completion.

Everyone knows our shellfish industry has almost been ruined by sewage pollution. Here in the metropolitan area everyone knows about the ruination of our beaches by sewage pollution. Our plan will eliminate that pollution, for there will be no more dumping of sewage disposal effluent into our rivers, bays and ocean.

This protection of the health of our people and children when they go swimming in the summer time and the saving of the property values—now down to a vanishing point at many beaches—is worth the investment alone. But the main point above all is that we are giving back to nature some of the water resources it loans to us.

There is one last point, and one not to be lightly considered. The very vastness of the project would mean the employment of thousands of workers and a colossal purchasing program that would add to our prosperity while at the same time proving an absolute necessity for the welfare of our people.

Signed:

Harry Deegan Flock
and Donald F. Flock.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: DEC. 22, 1950

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: *Bacteriological Warfare*

ReBulet December 8 last.

For the information of the Bureau,
 did not contact the Chicago Office in connection with the
 I am attaching a copy
 of a letter signed by

It will be noted that in this letter
 indicates that the FBI among other Governmental
 agencies would be present during
 In compliance with the Bureau's instructions, no agent of
 this office attended.

Enc.

JAR:MNW
66-1

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

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